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EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS: PENNSYLVANIA AND THE
JUDICIAL DISCRETION FOUNDATIONAL
RULE

I.

INTRODUCTION

There are several stages into which a civil litigation may be
divided: the state of affairs out of which the claim arises; process; pleadings; trial; judgment; execution.' Of all of these, the
rules of evidence figure most prominently during the fourth stage,
the trial, at which time the facts are presented for application of
the law.2 There are many items besides facts, such as burdens of
proof and persuasion, inferences, presumptions and the like, which
play significant roles during the trial. However, all of these devices constitute but an empty calculus, waiting for evidentiary facts
to be presented.3
There are many ways evidence may be presented, but ordinarily the most prominent vehicle is that of witnesses. When a witness gives testimonial evidence as to a fact, a judicial inference
arises as to the existence of that fact.4 The inference is made by
the trier of fact because the testimony is worthy of belief or, alternatively, because the witness is credible.5 But it is not to be
overlooked that the makers of testimonial assertions are subject to
failings. In the course of experience, every individual learns that
the personal characteristics of a reporter bear upon the reliability
of the report, and these characteristics must be taken into account
when the inference from assertion to fact is made. 6
1. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Id. Facts have a very high ontological status in the eyes of Justice. It might truly be said, in the words of the philosopher, that for the
purpose of a trial, "The world is the totality of facts, not things." L. WinrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoIco-PLosopHIcus § 1.1 (1961).
3. See 1 J. WIMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1-3 (3d ed. 1940). The theories and
definitions of evidence are part of the far reaching metaphysics of the law.
Sources for in depth discussion of these topics include: E. COHEN & M.
COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1951); R. FoEGLIN, EVIDENCE AND MEANING (1967); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1962); A. OSBORN, THE PROBLEM OF PROOF (1922); J. WIGMORE, PRICIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937); Patterson, Evidence: A Functional
Meaning, 18 VAND. L. REV. 875 (1965).
4. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as 3A WIGMORE].
5. Id.
6.
Credibility of witnesses and evaluation of their testimony
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The feasibility of making this inference is always open to question when testimonial evidence is presented, and the process known
as impeachment is the attack on the various components of the
witness' credibility and hence an attack on the trustworthiness of
his testimony. 7 A successful attack obviates the judicial inference
and the subject matter of the testimonial assertion does not receive
the status of fact. The attack, as such, is made upon witnesses who
have given testimony adverse to the attacker's position. Generally
such testimony comes from the "enemy camp," although there are
times when one's own witness will be the subject of attack.
The impeachment of the several categories, i.e., characterizations, of "one's own witness" will be considered herein.8 However,
no direct attention will elsewhere be given to the actual contradiction of one's own witness as to a material fact (as opposed to a
prior inconsistent statement), a procedure which is not generally
prohibited.9 When contradiction is necessary so as to prove the
calling party's case, discrediting his witness is only an incident to
that proof because it is inevitable. 10 "The mere fact of calling a
witness does not mean that the party thereby admits as true everything the witness may say, and he is not estopped from proving
Contradiction is a
the facts otherwise or by other evidence.""'
manner of impeaching a witness 12 but as it is not a direct attack
on the witness' credibility, it is permitted.18 In Pennsylvania, the
will always present critical problems difficult to solve in the trial
court. Improved rules of evidence will give greater freedom to
counsel in their attack upon the problem, but they cannot eliminate
the difficulties of proof, for these difficulties vary with each factual
situation and with each witness. If a perfect substantive law could
be assumed and a perfected system of trials established, it might
appear that these difficulties would be solved. Unfortunately, such
would not be the case. As long as human beings are subject to
error in perception and communication, failure of memory, and the
willingness on the part of some to falsify whenever there is sufficient motivation, trials will require skills and techniques in the use
of the law of evidence for solution of disputed questions of fact.
Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 239 (1967).
7. See F. CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE §§ 132-33 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 2 CoNoRAD]; 4 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 2611 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 4 Jones]; C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 33 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; 3A WIGMORE §§ 874-80.
8. See Section IVC of this comment (beginning at note 180) infra.
9. See McCoRMIcK § 47 & n.51; 3A WIGmoRE § 908.
10. 3A WIGMORE § 908.
11. 2 G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 805 and cases cited n.62
(1953).
12. See note 18 and accompanying text infra. See also MCCORMICk
§ 47; 2A WIGMoRE § 908.
13. Commonwealth v. Staino, 204 Pa. Super. 319, 327-29, 204 A.2d 664,
668 (1968) (allocatur refused). "The distinction is whether one is directly

basis for this result is straightforward: contradiction supplies factual evidence which is to be considered along with the witness'
testimony, whereas pure impeachment ordinarily supplies no factual evidence.' 4 Actual contradiction as to a material fact will thus
not be considered.
Pennsylvania permits several means of attacking credibility. If
the witness is biased towards the party who sponsors him, or prejudiced against the sponsoring party's opponent, such an attitude may
be demonstrated. 15 In certain situations, the witness' character
may be explored to demonstrate that his testimony is unworthy
The witness may suffer from some defect, such as poor
of belief.'
eyesight or other lack of capacity to render reliable reports. 17 The
report itself may be contradicted 'by other evidence, which would
serve to make it questionable whether the witness' assertions of
fact can be depended upon as being true.'8 But the most frequent,
trying to discredit the credibility of one's own witness (impeachment) or
whether one is trying to make more accurate the testimony supplied by
one's own witness (contradiction)." Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544,
549, 227 A.2d 653, 656 (1967). This distinction is alternatively known as
that between permissible contradiction and non-permissible impeachment.

Id.

14. Commonwealth v. Staino, 204 Pa. Super. 319, 327-29, 204 A.2d 664,
668 (1968) (allocatur refused). Accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa.
544, 548-49, 227 A.2d 653, 656 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Deitrich, 221
Pa. 7, 70 A. 225 (1908); Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super. 160, 188
A.2d 784 (1963); Commonwealth v. Gurreri, 197 Pa. Super. 329, 178 A.2d
808 (1962). This has been disparagingly referred to as a "distinction without a difference." Commonwealth v. Smith, supra at 550, 227 A.2d at 657
(Bell, C.J., dissenting).
15. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lopinsen, 427 Pa. 284, 303-04, 234 A.2d 552,
564 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 647 (1967).
16. There are a number of ways a witness may be impeached because
of character. It is well established that a witness' generally bad reputation
for veracity in the community where he lives may always be shown, by
one who knows that reputation, for the purposes of indicating that he will
not tell the truth, and hence is unworthy of belief. E.g., Mathy v. Flory,
283 Pa. 331, 335-36, 129 A. 109, 110 (1925). A criminal defendant's bad reputation for veracity may be shown only if the defendant puts his reputation
into question by other witnesses. Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284,
309, 234 A.2d 552, 566 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 647 (1967).
That a witness has been convicted of a crime of crimens falsi may be
brought out, but it must be a conviction, not merely an accusation or indictment. E.g., Commonwealth v. Reins, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662
(1969). Admission of such evidence is within the trial court's discretion.
Flowers v. Green, 420 Pa. 481, 485-86, 218 A.2d 219, 221 (1966). If the defendant in a criminal trial has testified in his own behalf, evidence as to
prior convictions is admissible. E.g., Commonwealth v. Werner, 444 Pa. 458,
462-63, 282 Pa. 258, 261 (1971). See Note, The Use of Prior Convictions
to Impeach the Credibility of the Defendant in Pennsylvania, 66 DICK. L.
REV. 339 (1962). Proof of particular acts are generally not admissible for
impeachment purposes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209,
232, 19 A.2d 288, 296-97 (1941). For further development, and lists of cases,
see 1 G. HENRY,PENNSYLVANIA EvDENC

§§ 159-63 (1953); 2 G. HENRY,PENN-

EvmENC §§ 801-10, 815-16 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 2 HENRY];
41 P.L.E. Witnesses §§ 171-82 (1961).
17. E.g., Commonwealth v. Dreibelbus, 217 Pa. Super. 257, 260-61, 269
A.2d 387, 389 (1970).
18. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548-49, 227 A.2d 653,
SYLvAN-IA
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and perhaps most effective means of impeaching a witness is by
proving that the witness has made out-of-court statements inconsistent with his testimony, best known as prior inconsistent state-

ments. 19
A prior inconsistent statement might be defined as any statement made previously by the witness which is inconsistent with
his present testimony. 20 This definition does not include inconsistencies within the witness' present testimony, but rather statements
made while not before this particular legal tribunal. 2' Although
evidence of the prior inconsistent statement may appear to be hearsay, 22 such evidence is introduced as proof of the fact of inconsistin the out-of-court utency rather than proof of the matter stated
24
terance 23 and hence is not hearsay at all.
The fact of inconsistency in what the witness has related at
656 (1967) (distinction between contradiction and impeachment highlighted).
19. McCoRanacs § 33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ravenell, 448 Pa.
162, 169, 292 A.2d 365, 369 (1972); Commonwealth v. Zapata, 447 Pa. 322,

331, 290 A.2d 114, 119 (1972); Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 421 Pa. 419,
432, 219 A.2d 666, 673 (1966); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 301 Pa. 640,
645, 139 A.2d 663, 666 (1958); Commonwealth v. Gatewood, 221 Pa. Super.
399, 402, 293 A.2d 80, 82 (1972); In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 449, 268
A.2d 170, 173 (1970).
20. McCORMICK § 34.
21. If the inconsistent statements are made while testifying, they are
automatically before the trier of fact, consequently there is no need to prove
the existence of a contrary prior statement by cross-examination or extrinsic
proof.
22. Perhaps the best known formulation of the definition of hearsay
is the one espoused by McCormick:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence of a
statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an
assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.
McCorMIcx § 246 nn.46-47. It should be noted that pure hearsay is inadmissible to impeach: "[W]hile a witness may be discredited by showing
prior inconsistent statements . .. the rule does not go so far as to say that
a witness may be discredited by what someone else has said the witness
has said." Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 435, 62 A.2d 75, 78 (1948). See
Pullman, Inadmissible Hearsay as Evidence to Impeach a Witness Other
than the Declarant,57 N.W.U.L. R,. 499 (1962). See also Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 506, 43 A.2d 571, 575 (1945). But
see Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 391, 290 A.2d 246, 251 (1972).
23. This is true of purely impeaching evidence, but there are cases
when the prior inconsistent statement may be admitted as substantive evidence. See Section IVB of this comment (beginning at note 150) infra.
There has also been much discussion about allowing the proof of prior inconsistent statements to be substantive evidence at all times. See note 134
infra.

24. See 4 Jones § 262.2; McCORMIcK § 251; 3A WIGMORE § 1018.

two distinct points in time is what leads to the question of his credibility. Where the present testimony and the prior statement are
incompatible, and but one can be the case, 25 it is not unreasonable
to question whether either is the case. The inconsistency demonstrates that the witness is capable of error. This leads to the inference that the witness is capable of having made other errors 26
which casts a shadow upon the reliability of his entire testimony
27
in the eyes of the trier of fact.
The prior statement may have been made in a number of ways:
orally; 28 in a writing;29 in a deposition;3 0 in the peadings of the
current action; 31 or another action;3 2 or in the testimony of another action.33 Regardless of how made, the primary requirement
25.

3A WIGmORE

§ 1017.

26. E.g., Brune v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 365, 200 A.2d 405, 407 (1964);
In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 450, 268 A.2d 170, 173 (1970); 3A WIaMOaE
§ 1017. The fact of inconsistency between statements out of court and testimony effects credibility. E.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 430,
88 A.2d 915, 922 (1952); Commonwealth v. Douglas, 185 Pa. Super. 269, 275,
138 A.2d 193, 195 (1958); Commonwealth v. Bartel, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 537,
136 A.2d 166, 172 (1958) (allocatur refused).
27. In Pennsylvania, if the trier of fact finds that a witness intentionally testified falsely about a material fact, they may disregard that witness'
entire testimony under the doctrine of falsus in une, falsus in omnibus.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 202 Pa. Super. 350, 353-54, 197 A.2d 226, 228
(1963) (allocatur refused). If upon cross-examination as to the prior inconsistent statement the witness denies having made the prior statement, this
maxim becomes applicable, for "[t]he triers may look upon the denial as
an intentional falsification rather than a failure to remember." Ladd, Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 250 (1967). See generally
3A WIGMORE §§ 1008-15. This is one of the more practical aspects of the
foundational requirement from the impeaching party's point of view.
28. E.g., Perciavalle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 89, 252 A.2d 702, 703 (1969).
29. E.g., Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 205 A.2d 680,
682 (1962). For the purposes of this comment 'inconsistent statement' will
be taken to mean "an inconsistent utterance, regardless of form." The primary perspective involved in the discussion will be from the angle of the
foundation for extrinsic evidence as it relates to the introduction of extrinsic
impeaching evidence, as opposed to examining all the steps necessary to
introduce a particular type of evidence. All the various types of impeaching evidence have been gathered under the genus "impeaching evidence"
to limit the discussion to the foundation common to all the different species
which compose that genus. The qualitative difference between oral statements and written statements bears mentioning. There is a precondition
to even the foundation when the statement is written: the witness must
be shown the statement and admit having written it, or at least having
signed it. See, e.g., Greelen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 400 Pa. 240, 246, 161
A.2d 595, 598 (1960); 2 HENRY § 819. This vestage of this first rule of The
Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820) is discussed briefly
in notes 58-66 and accompanying text infsra.
30. PA. R. Civ. P. 4020(a) (1).
31. E.g., Monaco v. Gula, 407 Pa. 522, 180 A.2d 893 (1962).
32. E.g., Ham v. Gouge, 214 Pa. Super. 423, 428, 257 A.2d 650, 652
(1969). But the party against whom the pleading is used as an admission
is not estopped from taking a different position in the subsequent action.

Id.
33. E.g., DeJohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 363, 240 A.2d 472, 475 (1968)
(coroner's inquest). The notes of testimony taken at a magistrate's hearing,
for example, are admissible to show prior inconsistent statements. PA.
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is that the prior statement be, in fact, inconsistent with the
present testimony, else the prior statement is not usable.8 4 However, there exists no sure test for the proper degree of inconsistency
and the cases range from requiring a contradiction 3 5 to requiring
36
The
only some material variance between the two statements.
of
discretion
range
a
best position appears to allow the trial court
within which reasonableness is to be exercised so that a decision
circumstances of each instance of impeachmay be made upon the
87
ment by this method.
A specific type of prior inconsistent statement is at the center
of this inquiry: inconsistent statements which may be proven by
extrinsic evidence. Besides the requisite inconsistency, this variety
encounters a secondary hurdle: the statements which are incompatible must have been made regarding a material issue.3 8 Collateral explorations would clearly be extremely time consuming
with minimal return if extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements as to immaterial issues was allowed.39
There are two means by which the fact of a prior inconsistent
statement may be introduced, by cross-examination, or by extrinsic
proof. Cross-examination is always available 40 but is not always
See Commonwealth v. Fields, 171 Pa.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1140 (1966).
Super. 177, 181, 90 A.2d 391, 393 (1952). This list of sources of prior incon-

sistent statements is meant to be illustrative, and not exhaustive.

34. See Rosenson v. Lyle, 436 Pa. 354, 361, 261 A.2d 79, 83 (1970);
Koper v. Mamone, 419 Pa. 601, 606, 215 A.2d 641, 644 (1966); Puskarich v.
Trustees of Zembo Temple, 412 Pa. 313, 318, 194 A.2d 208, 211 (1963).
35. Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 86 F. Supp. 284, 290 (E.D.
Pa. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 183 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1950).
36. E.g., Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 365, 200 A.2d 405, 407 (1964).
37. See McCoRMrCK § 34.
38. E.g., Papa v. Pittsburgh Penn-Center Corp., 421 Pa. 228, 229, 218
A.2d 783, 789 (1966) (per curium, affirmed). A witness' testimony can
easily contain some inconsequential proposition which is at variance with
some statement he made at another time. The efficacy of attempting to
impeach a witness' veracity by proving that at another time he had inconsistently stated he was wearing shoes and not sneakers is open to doubt.
39. McGoldrick v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 430 Pa. 597, 600, 241 A.2d
90, 92 (1969); Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 364, 200 A.2d 405, 406 (1964);
"There is
In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 451, 268 A.2d 170, 174 (1970).
no rule more firmly established than this: 'No contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters.'" Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 223,
19 A.2d 288, 295 (1941). Accord, e.g., McGoldrick v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
430 Pa. 597, 600, 241 A.2d 90, 92 (1968); Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 203,
53 A.2d 604, 605 (1947); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 434-35, 62 A.2d
75, 77 (1948). The current test for materiality appears to be whether the
subject matter would be independently provable in the impeaching party's
case. See McGoldrick v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra at 600-01, 241 A.2d
at 92-93; 2 HENRY § 802.
40. E.g., Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 364, 200 A.2d 405, 406 (1964).

effective as the witness may fail to remember the prior statement
or refuse to acknowledge that it had been made. Proof by extrinsic
evidence is always effective, but is not always available because
of a well-known evidentiary rule which requires a so-called foundation for extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements. This
rule is the focus of this comment.
The term 'foundation' ordinarily connotes a basic structure
upon which other things are built. The foundation discussed here
is a structure of questions and answers upon cross-examination
which sets up subsequent introduction of evidence. In terms of
extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement, the foundation recounts the circumstances of the witness' inconsistent utterance so
that he may admit it and explain or reconcile it, or deny it. This
groundwork, as it is sometimes called, is the initial step in bringing
the incompatible statements together. If the prior statement inconsistent with the present testimony is acknowledged by the witness,
he himself puts the two statements before the trier of fact so that
the effect upon his credibility may be adjudged. Should the witness deny having made the prior inconsistent statement, he sets
himself up for contradiction on the fact of inconsistency, the extrinsic proof being a natural product of the foundation.
The rule requiring a foundation is not followed in any uniform
manner throughout the various common law jurisdictions. 4' The
rule itself is slightly more than a century and a half old, and several
alternatives to it exist. This comment will discuss the rule and
its origin, consider the alternatives to the rule, and examine the
manner in which the foundation is employed with respect to the
42
classes of witnesses who appear in civil litigation in Pennsylvania.
II. ORIGIN OF THE RULE REQUIRING A FOUNDATION
The source of the rule requiring the laying of a foundation on
cross-examination before extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements is admissible is the celebrated trial of Queen Caroline, The
Queen's Case.4 3 Before the decision was rendered, there apparently was no foundational requirement: "[n]one of the treatises
by practitioners, English or American, published prior to The
Queen's Case mentions such a proviso.

' 44

A trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of a witness concerning
a prior inconsistent statement is valid ground for ordering a new trial. DeJohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 364, 240 A.2d 472, 475 (1968).
41. See Sections IIIB & C of this comment (beginning at note 95)
infra.

42. The impeachment of criminal defendants, at this time, is a highly
volatile question, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
43. 2 Brod. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
44. 3A WIGMORE § 1026. "It is said by Church, C.J. in Hedge v. Clapp
... and by Parker, C.J. in Tucker v. Welsh. . . that the practice in England
before The Queen's Case was not established, but that the circuits and
judges differed." Id. at n.1.
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The Queen's Case has an interesting factual background. Caroline of Brunswick was married to the (then) Prince of Wales in
1795 and separated from him a year later, after the birth of their
daughter. The Prince became Regent for his father King George
III, "the old mad king" and excluded Caroline from his Court in
1814. The Prince hated Caroline violently and, with the approaching death of George III, considered a divorce from Caroline and
the concomitant prevention of her coronation among his highest
priorities. Upon being excluded from Court, Caroline went abroad,
"and at once ugly rumors spread about her private life."'45 In 1819,
the Prince sent a "'Secret Commission of Inquiry" to Italy to collect
evidence to be used in obtaining a divorce. This six month inquiry
amassed a report "on Princess Caroline's misconduct which fulfilled
the Regent's utmost hopes." 46 Several months later George III
died. Hoping to make use of the threat of a public trial, divorce,
and disgrace, the Prince offered Caroline a large annuity if she
would remain abroad and accept a title less than Queen. Caroline
refused, and amidst much ballyhoo, returned home.
On July 4, 1820, the trial began, the charge being that Caroline
had had "'an adulterious connection with a foreigner originally in
her service in a menial capacity.' ''4 Adultery by the Queen
amounted to treason, the penalty for which was dissolution of her
marriage and forfeiture of the royal title. The trial, held before
the House of Lords, extended over a period of approximately four
months. It seems to have been a very lively affair filled with recriminations, brilliant oratory by respective counsel, and above all,
sordid accounts of the indiscretions Caroline had committed
throughout the continent with Bergami, "the foreigner" and a
"eunuch whom she had brought back from the East." 48 Large numbers of witnesses were heard, including many domestics who had
served Caroline during the questioned period, and been dismissed
by her, ostensibly because of their knowledge. The final result of
the trial was that the mandatory third reading of the Bill against
Caroline was passed by a slim majority and the whole matter subsequently dropped. 49 Caroline went free of the threatened punishments and died several months later.50
45. 2 E. HALEVY, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE IN THE 19TH CENr'nY, THE LIBERAL AWAKENING 1815-1830, at 85 (1961).

46.

Id. at 86.

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 100.

50.

Other accounts of the circumstances of Caroline's trial include: T.

GREEvEY, THE GREEVEY PAPERS (1904); LORD HOLLAND, FURTHER MEMOIRS OF

The Queen's Case51 consists of "Opinions given by the Judges,
in Answer to certain Questions of Evidence put to them by the
Lords in the Course of Proceedings against the Queen, and confirmed by the House. ' 52 The interrogatories leading to these opinions span a number of topics, two of which constitute the source
of the vast majority of citations to the case as authority: the rule
requiring that a witness be permitted to read a document written
or signed by him before cross-examination as to its contents could
proceed; and the rule requiring a foundation for impeachment by
extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements.
The first of these rules58 has been soundly criticized by the
commentators 4 as being "a rule which for unsoundness of principle,
impropriety of policy, and inconvenience in trials [is] the most
'55
notable mistake that can be found . . . upon the present subject.
Succinctly stated, the rule requires that before a witness may be
cross-examined about a document written by him or over his name,
he must be shown the document so as to identify it as having been
written by him. 56 If he denies having written it, the inquiry ends
there; if he admits having written it, then counsel may use it as
evidence, but the whole letter must be read to the court. 57 The
reasoning behind the rule has been admonished as being a misinterpretation of the "Best Evidence Rule," 58s severely hampering the
effectiveness of cross-examination.59 Despite the fact that England
abrogated this rule by statute two score years later,6 0 it was
1807-1824, at 285-95 (1905); S. LESLIE, GEORGE TE FOURH
103-14 (1926); 4 McCARTHY, THE FOUR GEORGES AND WILLIAM IV 6-8 (1907);
D. STUART, PORTRAIT OF TiE PRINCE REGENT 100-22 (1953).

THE WHI PARTY

51.

2 Brod. & B. 294, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).

52.

Id.

53. Id. at 286-88, 129 Eng. Rep. at 976-77.
54. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1259-60 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as 4 WbGMoRE]; McCouvICK § 28.
55. 4 WIGMORE § 1259.
56. The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 294, 296-98, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 977
(1820). See 4 WIaMORE §§ 1259, 1261.
57. The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 287, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 977
(1820). The justification is that:
If the course which is here proposed, should be followed, the crossexamining counsel may put the Court in possession only of a part
of the contents of the written paper; and thus the Court may never
be in possession of the whole, though it may happen that the whole,
if produced, may have an effect very different from that which
might be produced from a statement of the part.
Id. Only a few lines need be shown for purposes of identification. Id. at
287, 129 Eng. Rep. at 977. See 4 WIGMORE § 1261.
58. "The contents of every written paper, are, according to the ordinary and well established rules of evidence, to be proved by the paper itself,
and by that alone, if the paper is in existence ...

"

The Queen's Case,

2 Brod. & B. 284, 286, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 977 (1820).
59. 4 WIGMORE § 1260. Wigmore reproduces several interesting cases
which demonstrate how the efficacy of cross-examination would be destroyed by strict application of this rule. Id.
60. The Criminal Procedure Act of 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 18, 9 HALS.
STAT. 587-88 (2d ed. 1949) (applies to civil as well as criminal actions).
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adopted in some form or another in many jurisdictions in the United
States. 1
The second rule of The Queen's Case is directed towards impeachment by extrinsic proof, rather than towards impeachment
by the witness' own acknowledgement of having made an inconsistent statement upon cross-examination. The formula for the
foundation, as espoused by the court in The Queen's Case is quite
simple: before a witness may be impeached by extrinsic proof of
prior inconsistent statements, he must be asked whether or not he
made the statement: if he denies having made the statement, then
extrinsic proof is admissible to contradict and hence impeach him;
if he admits having made the inconsistent statement, the necessity
of extrinsic evidence has been dispelled" as the witness has effectively impeached himself.
The court in The Queen's Case gave several justifications for
the propriety of requiring a foundation. First, extrinsic proof is
superfluous if the witness impeaches himself. 2 Secondly, the witness will have an opportunity to explain away the apparent inconsistency, and place the statement in its proper context. Thirdly,
neither the witness nor the sponsoring party will be unfairly surprised" in that the extrinsic proof will not be the initial indication
that a prior inconsistent statement was made 'by the witness.14 A
fourth justification advanced was that part of the function of the
foundation is to refresh the memory of the witness so as to enable
him to give an accurate answer. 65 Finally, at that juncture in
history discrediting a person's veracity was to be taken seriously,
as is illustrated by the following comment in support of the foundational requirement:
[T]o allow the proof of his former conversation to be
adduced without first interrogating him to that conversation, and reminding him of it, would, in many cases, have
an unfair effect upon him and upon his credit, and would
deprive him of that reasonable protection, which it is, in my
opinion, the duty of every Court to afford to every person
who appears as a witness on the one side and on the other. 66
The upshot of the rule is mandatory cross-examination with
respect to prior inconsistent statements which, if not culminating
61.

See 4 WIGMORE § 1259.

63.

The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 313, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 988

64.

Id. at 314, 129 Eng.

65.

Id. at 299, 300, 129 Eng. Rep. at 982.
1& at 300-01, 129 Eng. Rep. at 982.

62. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.

(1820).

66.

in self-impeachment by the witness, is at least preliminary to impeachment by extrinsic proof. Since its inception, the rule has been
widely adopted, influencing trial procedure in a great many of the
Anglo-American jurisdictions.67 In some of those jurisdictions the
rule has evolved to a new and different form, 68 but basic tenants
of the rule still remain. Queen Caroline died more than 150 years
ago, but her rule, though changing through time, appears to be here
to stay.
III.

THE THREE ALTERNATVs

The particular piece of testimony which serves to impeach a
witness cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather it must be viewed
in the larger context of the impeachment process which involves
several points in time and several participants. The points in time
are threefold: the time of some statement prior to the speaker's
testimony at trial;69 the time of the speaker's inconsistent testimony; and, the time of proof of the fact of inconsistency between
the prior statement and the present testimony. The participants
involved are the speaker of inconsistencies, the audience to the prior
statement, and the particular party trying to prove the fact of inconsistency.
The determination of the necessity of a foundation for extrinsic
proof of prior inconsistent statements is essentially the choice of
who is to select the focal point through which the fact of inconsistency is to be viewed.70 There are three approaches to this
means of relating the inconsistent statements. The first approach
requires the foundation, thereby fixing the speaker of inconsistencies as the focal point, permitting him to prove the fact of inconsistency by admitting it, or if he denies the fact of inconsistency,
setting the stage for a contradiction of his denial by extrinsic proof
of the inconsistency. The second requires no foundation, thus giving the impeaching party the option of fixing the focal point, either
with the speaker of inconsistencies by cross examining as to the
prior inconsistent statement, or with the audience, demonstrating
the fact of inconsistency purely by extrinsic evidence. The third
67. See Section IIIA of this comment (beginning at note 71) infra.

68. See Section IIIA of this comment (beginning at note 71) infra.
69. Strictly speaking, this is not the case, for in principle, inconsistent
statements subsequent to the witness' testimony should be admissible to impeach that testimony. No Pennsylvania cases have been found which put
forth this proposition, but it has been held elsewhere that as the importance
of the out-of-court statement is to show variance with the testimony, the
timing is not significant. Southern Beverage Co. v. Barbarin, 219 Miss. 493,
498, 69 So. 2d 395, 397-98 (1954). See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 584 (1957). In
common parlance, 'prior' is almost universally conjoined with 'inconsistent
statement,' so for convenience of discussion, the normal verbalization will
be used.
70. The fact of inconsistency is, of course, what impeaches. See notes
25-26 and accompanying text supra.
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leaves the option of fixing the focal point with the trial court, giving the court the discretion to determine the necessity for a foundation for extrinsic evidence as the circumstances of the particular
impeachment process require.
A. A FoundationRequired
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted
the foundational rule of The Queen's Case7 by statute7 2 or by case
law. 73 A typical formulation is found in the following statute:
Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by
proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his
testimony, he must first be asked whether he has made
such statement, and his attention must be called to the
time, place and circumstances, and to the person to whom
the alleged statement was made. .

.

. If the witness does

not distinctly admit making74such statement, evidence that
he did make it is admissible.
The elements of the foundation delineate the entire circumstances
of the utterance and help to isolate
the particular utterance the
7 5
impeaching party wishes to use
Some courts acknowledge that as long as the purpose of the
foundation is fulfilled, viz. calling the witness' attention to the circumstances of the prior inconsistent statement, neglecting to include all elements is not fatal to the subsequent offer of extrinsic
proof of the inconsistency.76 Other courts are not so generous, and
will not receive extrinsic proof if some combination of elements is
missing. 77 This latter position has been described as unjustified
71. 2 Brod. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
72. Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wyoming. 3A WIGMORtE § 1028
n.l.
73. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, lichigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 3A WIGMORE § 1028 n.1.
The rule was first adopted in the United States in Everson v. Carpenter,
17 Wend. 419 (N.Y. 1837).
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:493 (1950). See 4 JoNEs § 26:3: McCORMICK § 37; 3A WIGmooE § 1020 rL1.
75. See generally Hale, Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent Statements, 20 S. CAL. L. REV. 135-45 (1937).
76. See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 91 (Alas. 1971) (if evident
that witness knows of occasion of utterance, strict compliance unnecessary);
State v. Caldwell, 251 La. 780, 786, 206 So. 2d 492, 495 (1968) (where only
one possible occasion, need not be particularly precise). See generally 3A
WIOMORE § 1029 and cases cited n.l.
77. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 279 Ala. 371, 372, 185 So. 2d 401 (1966)
(all elements of foundation must be definite); Duran v. People, 162 Colo.
419, 426, 427 P.2d 318, 322 (1967) (extrinsic evidence not admissible without

and impolitic, amounting to a non-uniform application of a "fetish
formula prescribed as indispensible. '7 8 The former position appears the more reasonable because it ensures that the purpose of
the foundation is fulfilled without arbitrarily denying the extrinsic
evidence because an element of the foundation is missing. However, where no attempt has been made to lay the foundation, the
subsequent offer of extrinsic proof will be uniformly refused. At
the very least, all jurisdictions which have the foundational requirement agree that "as a general procedural rule the holding in
the Queen's Case is salutory."79
Besides the original justifications, 0 several other reasons in
support of the rule have been advanced. The first of these recognizes that it is not an uncommon phenomena to forget a statement
made in conversation or a writing, especially when that statement
may have been made several years previously. Isolating the utterance can clearly stimulate the witness' rememberance of it, permitting him to deny having made it or to admit the statement and
explain it if he can. A denial of having made the statement inconsistent with present testimony launches the process of proof by
extrinsic evidence: "[t]he impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements occurs when the attempt to refresh recollection
fails because the witness denies making the out-of-court statement
and extrinsic evidence is admitted to prove he did in fact make
it."' Refreshing recollection is, however, a mixed blessing for the
impeaching party as it encourages the witness to explain away the
inconsistency or reconcile it with his present testimony, thereby
eliminating the opportunity to impeach his veracity.
A second and perhaps the most important function of the foundational questions is giving the witness warning that the prior inconsistency will be used against him82 and giving him the opportunity to place it in its (proper) context. It is not to accuse the
impeaching party of falsifying evidence to observe that the audience
to the allegedly inconsistent statement is subject to the same infull foundations); Taylor v. State, 249 Ind. 518, 521, 231 N.E.2d 507, 508
(1967) (foundation must be so definite as to permit "yes" or "no" answer);
Huffman v. State, 479 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (merely asking
if witness made statement to someone insufficient). "Holdings are very frequent that this foundation is like Poor Richard's horseshoe nail-for want
of it, counsel will lose the whole battle with the trial judge refusing to let
his impeaching witness testify." J.McQumE, EviDEacr: COMMON SEsz
AN ComvnoN LAW 55 (1947).
78. 3A WGMORE § 1029.
79. Speiglberg, The Warning Question, 6 N.Y.U. L. Q. 397, 399 (1929).
80. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
81. Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 245 (1967).
82. Put another way, the witness will not be unfairly surprised, a reason given in The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 314, 129 Eng. Rep. 976,
988 (1820). See note 65 and accompanying text supra. See also 3A WiGMoRE § 1025.
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firmities of memory as the witness, not to mention the possibility
of misconstrual of what was uttered.
A slightly whimsical example will serve to illustrate. Suppose
A, a student, saw D, the defendant, throw a "molotov cocktail,"
which act resulted in the destruction of a house. B, A's classmate,
comes along shortly afterwards, and a discussion ensues. While
walking by this pair, C, a curiosity seeker attracted by the sound
of sirens, overhears A saying "It was dynamite." At D's trial, A
testifies that he saw D throw a "molotov cocktail," while C is prepared to testify that he heard A state it was dynamite. If the foundational questions are not put to A, he will not have the chance
to dispell the prima facie inconsistency of "dynamite" and "molotov
cocktail" by explaining that he and B happened to be discussing
a recent movie thay had both seen, which he had described as "truly
outstanding" ("dynamite") in the vernacular of his peer group. If
there is, in fact, no discrepancy, then the witness ought to be allowed to show that an esoteric connotation to a word created the
confusion, or that the meaning of the proposition asserted to be
inconsistent has no connection at all with the present testimony.
If the prior statement was made under a mistake, this too ought
to be brought out so that the trier of fact may properly weigh the
inconsistencies in determining the discrediting effect.83
There are several subsidiary functions of the foundation which
also bear mentioning. The foundational questions do serve to warn
the trial court and the trier of fact of forthcoming impeachment.
The trier of fact is put on notice of the inconsistency which, as
a matter of practice, is the effect hoped for when the impeaching
party unearths the inconsistency. 4 The weakest purpose attributable to the foundation is its saving of time as extrinsic proof beThis rule is founded upon common sense, and is essential
83.
to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by
the necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and show that they were made under a mistake,
or that there is no discrepancy between them and his testimony.
Conrad v. Griffey, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 38, 46-47 (1853). But the foundational
questions also leave the door open to the "clever falsifier" to reconcile the
discrepancy and enhance his credibility. See note 86 infra.
84. As a practical trial technique to gain the most from impeaching testimony through proof of prior inconsistent statement, it is
preferable to follow the procedure of laying the full foundation
with a denial that he made the statement. If the triers of fact concludes that the statement was in fact made, the impeachment value
is enhanced. The triers may look upon the denial as an intentional
falsification rather than a failure to remember. The principle of
falso in une, false in omnibus may become applicable if there is
other evidence indicating intention to falsify.
Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52
CoRNELL L.Q. 239, 245 (1967).

comes redundant if the witness admits the inconsistencies and is
unable to reconcile them, thus impeaching himself.8 5 There is, however, little reason to expect, either analytically or empirically, significant reduction in trial time.
This initial polar alternative is susceptible to its own particular
infirmities. Besides protecting the witness who is forgetful, or was
misunderstood, the foundational rule also affords protection to the
so-called "clever falsifier." 86 This is the witness who, upon being
reminded of his previous statements, has the ability to concoct a
glib yet plausible explanation of the prima facie inconsistency between his former statement and his present testimony. It is true
that there are few things which can be done with the perjerous
witness except catch him falsifying his testimony. With or without
the foundation,8 7 a determined perjurer may avoid being impeached, and the impeaching party can only hope to discredit the
explanation and restore the impeaching effect of the prior statement.88 Unfortunately, there is also the "not-so-clever falsifier,"
a witness who ordinarily would not dream of falsifying but who,
when confronted with his prior inconsistency, could conceivably
feel bound to find an explanation where one did not exist. Perhaps
ultimately the story told would be so fabulous as to aid in impeaching himself, but clearly, such falsification is not to be encouraged.
The second problem encountered by the use of the foundational
rule is actually a set of problems with a common source: the discovery of the inconsistent statement may come sometime after the
opportunity to lay the foundation has been removed.8 9 There are
various situations in which this problem may be encountered if the
foundational rule is strictly applied and the lack of a foundation
works to prevent extrinsic evidence from being admitted. If crossexamination has been completed and the witness has left the stand
85. The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 313, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 988
(1820). There exist several other ways the foundation could be said to save
time. If the witness dispells the inconsistency, the need of extrinsic proof
is eliminated. See McQunm, supra note 74, at 54-55. But see 4 JONES §
26:9 (rebuttal testimony admissible to discredit the explanation and reestablish impeaching effect); 3A WIGMORE § 1036 (same). Also, if the court
rules that the matter is collateral, and hence not explorable except on cross-

examination, time is saved. The germane/collateral dichotomy is men-

tioned in note 39 supra.
86. Professor Morgan has several times used the "clever falsifier" in
support of MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(1) (1942), which obviates the
other rule of The Queen's Case, requiring a writing be read by the witness
before he could be cross-examined as to it. See Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the A.L.I., 27 A.B.A.J. 587, 589 (1941); MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE at 11 (forward by E. Morgan). There is no reason why the
example cannot be used with respect to al inconsistent statements.
87. If there were no foundation necessary and none laid, a determined
perjurer could very well retake the stand after extrinsic evidence was introduced so as to make a false recital and extract himself from impeachment.
88. See 4 JONES § 26:9, 3A WIOMORE § 1036.
89. See generally J. McQUE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 54-57 (1947); 3A WIOMORE §§ 1027, 1030-32.
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before the extrinsic evidence comes to light, the offer of the extrinsic evidence may be refused. 90 Likewise, if the information is
received by the party after a deposition was taken, 9' or after the
witness dies or becomes otherwise incompetent, 92 the same result
may follow. Furthermore, the witness may leave the courthouse
before the party who wishes to impeach him learns of the inconsistent statement, or alternately, before there is a chance to recall
the witness to ask the foundational questions.98 In all circumstances of this type, the foundational rule operates to favor the witness who might otherwise be impeached and ignores even bona fide
90. This is unlikely, however, as the refusal of the extrinsic evidence
will lead to the witness being recalled so as to lay the foundation. See
Covanhavan v. Hart, 21 Pa. 495, 502 (1853) (can always recall a witness
to lay foundation for proof of prior inconsistent statements). This latter
course was criticized in an early case refusing to accept the foundational
rule:
No lawyer in this commonwealth can, I think, recollect an instance of an impeaching witness being stopped, until the other was
called up and asked whether he had had any conversation with the
person about to impeach him, and was reminded of the conversation.
Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160, 166 (1821).
91. A good example is Shannon v. Castner, 21 Pa. Super. 294 (1902).
A witness of the plaintiff, one Walley, was present in court part of the time
but was unable to testify as the preliminary examination showed he was
mentally unable to give good testimony, and his deposition was permitted
to be read into testimony. The defendant subsequently offered to show that
Walley had made inconsistent statements after the deposition was taken.
The plaintiff objected because of the lack of a foundation. In a strict foundation jurisdiction this objection would have been sustained. But Pennsylvania is a judicial discretion jurisdiction and the court exercised its discretion in overruling the objection. The superior court affirmed. Id. at 323-24.
The fact that the plaintiff proved that the witness was incompetent to testify was a sufficient contingency to suspend the foundational requirement.
Id. See notes 139-40 and accompanying text infra.
92. See 3A WIcMORE §§ 1030-34.
93. In a well known opinion, Justice Davis of the Vermont Supreme
Court, criticized the strict foundational rule on just this point:
On the other hand, this rule would be productive of intolerable
mischiefs, were it not mitigated by the somewhat awkward and
inconvenient expedient of suspending the regular course of testimony, for the purpose of recalling the witness proposed to be impeached and laying a foundation for the impeaching testimony by
interrogating him whether he did or said the things proposed to
be proved. Besides, the privilege of doing this will be lost in all
those cases where the witness has left court and cannot be found;
the opposite party has every inducement to cut off this opportunity
by immediately discharging all such as he may have reason to suspect are liable to be impugned.
Downer v. Dana, 19 Vt. 338, 345 (1847), cited in 3A WIGMORE § 1027. The
court in The Queen's Case suggested the obvious solution: if the matter
is important, stop the trial and get the witness back. The Queen's Case,
2 Brod. & B. 284, 313, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 987 (1820). Unfortunately, few
courts regard this as expeditious.

discrepancies because the foundational formula was not fulfilled. 94
B.

No FoundationRequired

Although the majority of jurisdictions require the impeaching
party to lay a foundation, a small number of the jurisdictions in
the United States have chosen the other polar alternative, and do
not require any foundation to be laid.9 5 The main thrust behind
this alternative is the recognition that the foundational requirement
is a procedural rule. As one court has stated:
Whatever may be the reasons for adopting the practice
in England, of first advising the witness on what grounds
he is about to be impeached, we are satisfied that such practice has never prevailed here; and we see no reason for introducing a rule altogether unknown to the practitioners in
this country. In England it is rather a matter of practice
than a rule of evidence, as would seem by the opinion of
the judges in the Queen's trial. It may date its origin long
since we were bound by English laws, and if so, would
have no force here, except by adoption.9 6
The rule requiring the foundation creates a strict order of presentation of proof when prior inconsistent statements are used to impeach.9 7 An alternate analysis of the procedure created by the
foundational rule is that the responsibility of ensuring that the witness has the opportunity to attempt reconciliation of the inconsistency rests with the impeaching party. By making the foundational
questions a condition precedent to extrinsic proof of the inconsistency an incidental benefit has been given to the party who sponsors
a witness in that the witness' credibility will be intact, irrespective
of his having made prior statements inconsistent with his testimony, if he can get off of the stand without having been asked
the foundational questions. The jurisdictions which have selected
the alternative of not requiring a foundation ostensively do not
agree.9 s In these jurisdictions, the responsibility of maintaining the
credibility of the witness lies on the sponsoring party rather than,
as is the case with the foundational rule, the impeaching party being charged with allowing the witness to attempt to maintain his
credibility.
This alternative is not without merit. It eliminates the cabalis94. See 3A WIGMORE § 1027; McCoRmzcK § 37.
95. Maine, Massachusetts (foundation required by statute if impeaching own witness, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23 (1959)), New Hampshire, North Carolina (no foundation necessary if matter is material to the
inquiry). 3A WIGMORE § 1028 & n.1.
96. Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160, 167 (1821).
97. The extrinsic proof may not proceed the opportunity to reconcile.
See note 117 and accompanying text infra. See generally Ladd, supra note
80, at 246-48.
98. See, e.g., Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160 (1821); Villineuve v. Manchester St. R. Co., 73 N.H. 250, 60 A. 748 (1908); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C.
246 (1879). See also 3A WIGMORE § 1028 and cases cited n.1.
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tic ritual entailed by the foundational rule and the arbitrary and
irreconcilable results generated by uniform application of the rule. 99
The party who neglects to ask "where?" or "when?" is not penalized.
If a cross-examining party forgets to ask about the prior inconsistent statement, his chances of impeaching a witness are not foreclosed. 100 The witness who has been impeached can always attempt
to restore his credibility by subsequent explanation, so that the
most important function of the foundation is not automatically
thwarted. 10 1 However, this alternative is not without its own
failings.
This position is basically subject to criticism on the grounds
that none of the functions performed by the foundation need ever
be fulfilled. The witness and his sponsoring party may be unfairly
surprised by the extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement, and the sponsoring party is the one penalized if the witness
is not available to explain upon demonstration of the inconsistency.
This latter effect would appear to be the most poignant argument
against this alternative, for there is merit in presuming, so to speak,
that the witness' testimony is the truth, and if the impeaching
party wishes to rebutt the "presumption," the entire burden should
lie with him.
C. The Middle Ground
The third alternative to the question of the necessity for a foundation may be called the judicial discretion rule. It exists in a few
jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, via case law 0 2 and has been
adopted in some form or another by the modern attempts at codifi103
cation of the rules of evidence.
99. 3A WIGMoRE § 1027.
100. "As there is at least an equal chance that the alleged contradictions
were really uttered and cannot be explained away, it is a poor policy that

favors exclusively the witness to be impeached by exempting him from impeachment ..
" 3A WIoMom § 1027.
101. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
102. Connecticut has long had the judicial discretion rule. See Adams
v. Herald Publishing Co., 82 Conn. 448, 455, 74 A. 755, 757 (1909); Hedge
v. Clapp, 22 Conn. 262, 269 (1853) ("II[S]ubject to such exceptions as a
sound discretion may, from time to time suggest"). The Pennsylvania formulation may be found at notes 118-20 and accompanying text infra. With
respect to Vermont, see Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322, 323, 85 A. 620, 621
(1913) ("The course taken by the court was entirely discretionary, and so
no error here."). See 3A WIOORE § 1028 n.1.
103. FED. R. Ev m. rule 613, 65 F.R.D. 139 (1975); CAL. Evm. CODE § 770
(West 1968); MODL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(2) (1942); UmoRM RuLEs
Ov EVIDENCE rule 22 (1954).

This rule, long championed by Wigmore 10 4 first appeared
in codified form in the Model Code of Evidence. 105 Rule 106(2)
provides that:
The judge in his discretion may exclude extrinsic evidence
of a written or oral statement of the witness offered [for
the purpose of impeaching his credibility] unless the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an
opportunity to deny or explain the statement.1 0 6
This rule is contained in substantially similar form in the Model
Code's successor, the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 107 Under this
rule if extrinsic evidence is offered without a foundation having
been laid, the trial court will weigh all the circumstances up to
the offer of impeaching extrinsic evidence and determine whether,
in fairness to all involved, the offer should be accepted.108
The operant word here is 'may,' which is susceptible to two
interpretations. It can be taken to mean that the lack of a foundation will prevent admission of extrinsic evidence unless there are
extenuating circumstances, i.e., admission without a foundation will
be the exception and not the rule. Or alternately, it could be taken
to mean that a foundation will be required only where the judge
feels it necessary as the extrinsic evidence is offered. The former
would seem to be the correct interpretation since there is general
agreement that the foundation is in itself a good thing as well as
being the better trial technique for the impeaching party. 10 9 That
104. See 2 J. WicMORE, EVIDENCE § 1027 (1904).
105. MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN E (1942).
106. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(2) (1942).
107. UNIFORM RULES Or EVIDENCE (1954) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM
RULES]. Rule 22(b) provides:
As affecting the credibility of a witness, extrinsic evidence of a
prior contradictory statement, whether oral or written, made by
the witness, may in the discretion of the judge be excluded unless
the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an
opportunity to identify, explain or deny the statement.
Kansas and New Jersey have adopted the UNIFORM RULES. Kentucky's
statutory provision has a similar impact, the court being allowed to admit
the evidence if it is impossible to comply with the ordinary foundational
requirement, if "the court finds that the impeaching party has acted in good
faith." Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.08 (1953).
108. The Comment to rule 106 (2) provides:
The present rule is flexible: it puts the evidence on the same basis
as other relevant evidence, and it enables the judge to prevent any
unfairness in the use of the evidence by permitting him to exclude
it whenever he believes that the failure to bring the statement to
the attention of the witness is just or expedient.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (2), Comment.
One author's comment on UNIFoRm RULE 22(b) is that "[p] lacing the
matter in the discretion of the trial judge will assure fairness to the witness
and yet will not prevent counsel from using ordinary trial technique to test
the reliability of conflicting narrations of fact relevant to crucial issues of
a trial." Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RurcES L. REv. 523, 535 (1956).
109. In general the preliminary question should indeed be put,
before producing the alleged contradiction; but that this requirement, instead of being rigid and invariable, should be open to exceptions, and should be dispensed with, in the court's discretion,
where the putting of the question has become impossible and the
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this is so is mirrored by the fact that leaving the determination
to the discretion of the court has been hailed as the solution to
the extraordinary situations where a rigid requirement would work
hardship on the impeaching party11 o rather than as a tool to be
used when the court feels the witness ought to have a chance to
explain.
The new Federal Rules of Evidence1 1' also adopt the judicial
discretion rule, but the pertinent rule is somewhat different in its
verbalization:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a
witness is not admissible unless the witness is offered an
opportunity to explain or deny the same . . . or the inter-

ests of justice otherwise require. 112
Under this rule, the trial court may in its discretion allow extrinsic
evidence where the impeaching party is not at fault for lack of a
foundation; 1 3 however, extrinsic proof is expressly proscribed if
there are no extenuating circumstances and the foundational requirements are not met. Despite the stronger language, this formulation is very flexible in that, unlike the A.L.I. formulation, 114 no
impeaching party has acted in good faith.
3A WIGMORE § 1027. See, e.g., J. McQuInE, EVIENCE: COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAw 54-56 (1947); 4 JONES § 26:3, McCoRMICK § 37; Ladd, Some
Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
239, 247-49 (1967); Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUTGRS L. Rav. 523, 524 (1956);
Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles and Modern
Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 14-17 (1958) ("[I]t is unfortunate that this sound
rule of practice should be treated as an article of faith which necessitates
observance in every instance."). This is also evidenced by the fact that the
foundation is nowhere forbidden. See generally 3A WIGMORE § 1023.
110. This point appears frequently, and has been used in support of
UNIFORM RULE 22 (b):
The requirement should not be mandatory, as has been recommended by the Legislative Commission. There are many cases in
which it would be a hardship for the requirement to be inflexible.
For instance, the party intending impeachment may not learn of
the prior inconsistent statement until after the witness has left the
court and is no longer available, so that the foundation could not
be laid. In such a case, the impeaching evidence would be inadmissible. Moreover, the requirement of the foundation might be overlooked in the heat of a trial; a party should not be penalized in
such an event, especially where the testimony is not crucial.
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COUiR CoMMrrrss ON EVIDENCE, at 70
(1963). Parenthetically, New Jersey adopted UNIFORM RULE 22(b), along
with many of the other rules in the NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE (1967).
111. FED. R. EvIn., 65 F.R.D. 139 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
RULES]. These rules are effective in federal courts, and with respect to
federal magistrates on July 2, 1975. Id. New Mexico has enacted the substance of the Federal Rules. NEW MExico RULES OF EVIDENCE (1973).
112. FEDERAL RULE 613(b).
113. FEDERAL RULE 613 (b), Advisory Committee's Note.
114. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.

order of presentation of evidence is prescribed. 1
Even though the
foundational questions must ordinarily be asked of the witness
whose credibility is in question, they need not necessarily come before the offer of extrinsic proof. 11
All of these formulations comprise what is truly the middle
ground, the foundation being neither universally required nor universally discarded. The trial court decides whether extrinsic evidence without a foundation should be admitted on a situation to
situation basis, its discretion acting as a buffer to two alternative
extremes. Ordinarily, the burden of the foundation, allowing the
witness to explain, will still fall upon the impeaching party but
the harshness of the strict rule is removed, and the burden is somewhat lightened. If one of the eventualities which prevent laying
of the foundation occurs, the court may allow extrinsic proof of
inconsistent statements if it feels this is the fairest course. Although it is not clear why it is superior to shift the burden of allowing the witness to explain his inconsistent statements from the
sponsoring party (as was the case before the foundational rule was
conceived) to the impeaching party, the vast majority of jurisdictions agree that this is the way to succeed.'1 7 If that burden
is to rest upon the impeaching party, the jurisdictions which have
adopted the judicial discretion rule have surely taken the most reasonable course.

IV. Tim

JuDIciAL DISCRETIoN RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA

The strict foundational rule was rejected by Pennsylvania
courts at an early date, and the judicial discretion rule adopted instead in an 1839 case, Sharp v. Emmet." 8 In its decision, the court
stated:
The rule now relied upon by the defendant is that which
was established in the Queen Case [sic] ....

[A] nd though there are many cases in which it would be
fair and proper, that a witness should have an opportunity
of refreshing his memory, by being directed particularly to
the subject, before he is contradicted, yet there are other
cases in which it would be inconvenient to lay it down as a
uniform rule of practice ....

We are disposed to leave it

in Pennsylvania, as a matter for the discretion of the courts
on the trial, as we believe it has, generally speaking, hitherto been.'1

This general rule has had continuous application since its initial
115.

FEDERAL RuLE 613(b).

116. See note 279 and accompanying text infra.
117. As discussed in Section IIB of this comment (beginning at note
95 supra), this burden is upon the sponsoring party only in those few jurisdictions where there does not exist some sort of foundational requirement.
118. 5 Whart. 287, 289 (Pa. 1839).
119. Id. at 299.
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statement; 12 0 however, several important exceptions are to be
found. In order to identify these exceptions, it is helpful to break
the class, 'witness', down into several of its most common subclasses
and examine the application of the general rule to each subclass
according to the characteristics of the witnesses which fall within
that grouping.
It must be noted at the outset that there is one line of cases
which has run afoul of the general rule.12 1 Only six years after
the Sharp decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, in
McAteer v. McMullan,122 that a foundation is necessary for im123
peachment by extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements.
Periodically thereafter, a case has appeared either citing McAteer,
or following the strict foundational rule.124 This trend faltered before the end of the 19th century, 125 but surprisingly, in some fairly
recent cases, the strict foundational rule has been anomalously
asserted. Steffy v. Carson,126 a 1960 case, is apparently authority
120. Commonwealth v. Dennison, 441 Pa. 334, 338, 272 A.2d 180, 18182 (1972); Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 49 A.2d 384 (1946) (rule enunciated for all witnesses); Commonwealth v. Powell, 303 Pa. 104, 154 A. 287
(1931); Commonwealth v. Dilsworth, 289 Pa. 498, 137 A. 683 (1927); Marshall v. Carr, 275 Pa. 86, 118 A. 621 (1922); Soravitz v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 261 Pa. 390, 104 A. 754 (1918); Caffery v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry.
Co., 261 Pa. 251, 104 A. 569 (1918); Rabinowitz v. Silverman, 223 Pa. 139,
72 A. 378 (1909); Cronkite v. Texler, 187 Pa. 100, 41 A. 22 (1898); Kay
v. Fredrigal, 3 Pa. 221 (1846); Sharp v. Emmet, 5 Whart. 287 (Pa. 1839);
Commonwealth v. Carter, 187 Pa. Super. 159, 144 A.2d 493 (1958) ; Commonwealth v. Rothman, 168 Pa. Super. 163, 77 A.2d 731 (1951) (allocatur refused); Sweeny v. Floyd, 90 Pa. Super. 14 (1926); Shannon v. Castner, 21
Pa. Super. 294 (1904); Baldi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 18 Pa. Super. 596 (1902);
Thomas v. Butler, 16 Pa. Super. 268 (1901) (allocatur refused); Commonwealth v. Cowan, 4 Pa. Super. 579 (1897). Cf. Commonwealth v. Farrior,
446 Pa. 31, 35, 284 A.2d 684, 686 (1971); Commonwealth v. Gatewood, 221
Pa. Super. 399, 402, 293 A.2d 80, 82 (1972); Commonwealth v. Fields, 171
Pa. Super. 177, 181-82, 90 A.2d 391, 393 (1952).
121. See 2 HENRY § 803; notes 122-28 and accompanying text infra.
122. 2 Pa. 32 (1845). "[W]e think, in justice to the witness, who has
rights as well as the parties, the defendants were bound to interrogate the
witness in the first instance as to what he did say, so that he may have
an opportunity to explain." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). This follows the
primary purpose of the foundation, advocated by the court in The Queen's
Case. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
123. McAteer v. McMullen, 2 Pa. 32, 33 (1845).
124. Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83, 87 (1874) (foundation necessary for
non-party witness "according to well settled rule"); Pier v. Duff, 63 Pa.
59, 64 (1869) (citing McAteer); Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102, 110 (1861)
(citing McAteer); Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. 274, 279 (1853) (citing McAteer);
Mitchell v. Welch, 17 Pa. 339, 342 (1851) (witness should be "cautioned or
admonished" before proof of inconsistent statements).
125. Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 (1874), is the last case in this particular line. There are certain "maverick" cases which do not rely on this
line for authority. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text infra.
126. 422 Pa. 548, 222 A.2d 894 (1960).

for the strict foundational rule, for the court, without citing any
authorities, stated: "The trial court properly ruled that the correct
manner for impeachment of a witness through the use of prior inconsistent statements is to confront the witness with the statements
and inquire as to their having been made."'127 The federal courts
have also attributed the strict foundational rule to Pennsylvania:
It is a well established principle of law that evidence of
contradictory statements made by a witness out of court
will not be admitted unless the witness has been previously given an opportunity to explain the alleged contradictory utterances.1 28
It is conceivable that these 20th century cases are not a continuation of the earlier line of "strict foundational" cases, nor even
a misstatement of the law, being instead misleading statements of
Pennsylvania law. In a manner of speaking, saying that a trial
court was correct in requiring a foundation is tantamount to refusing to disturb the trial court's discretion in its ruling on the
necessity of a foundation. 129 This analysis is possible only upon
the background of the generally prevalent judicial discretion rule
and therefore is the inferior explanation. In isolation, these formulations of the rule do not accurately state Pennsylvania's position
and statements such as the passage quoted above should be avoided,
even if it can be said in retrospect that they are directory, or express the court's acknowledgement that under ordinary circumstances a foundation is standard operating procedure. 80
A. The Ordinary Witness
During the course of a trial, many different sorts of witnesses
will testify, and they can be broken into three broad categories:
witnesses that an advocate will put on the stand; witnesses his
opponent will put on the stand; and, witnesses neither party can
be said to sponsor, e.g., witnesses called sua sponte. The category
into which the witness falls can be said to generally determine the
type of testimony which the advocate can expect to hear. In terms
of the above trichotomy, the testimony will be, respectively, favorable, nonfavorable, and indeterminate.
The vast majority of testimony adverse to a given party's posi127. Id. at 552, 222 A.2d at 896 (emphasis added).
128. Adamos v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 162, 164 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
94 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1938). Accord, Griffen v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307, 315
(3d Cir. 1955); United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824, 827 (W.D. Pa. 1952)
(citing Adamos v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.).
129. Adamos v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
94 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1939) cites two Pennsylvania cases, both of which say
that the foundation is discretionary. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 303 Pa.
104, 154 A. 287 (1931); Marshall v. Carr, 275 Pa. 86, 118 A. 621 (1922). Griffen v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1955) cites a different Pennsylvania
case which likewise says the judicial discretion rule is applicable. See
Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 49 A.2d 384 (1946).
130. See notes 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
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tion will ordinarily be purveyed by his opponent's witnesses.
Quite naturally, he will always be ready to use impeachment, as
it is an effective tool for negating adverse testimony. The archetypical impeachment involves a witness from the "enemy camp,"
whom we will call the "ordinary witness."
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that the prior inconsistent
statements of an ordinary witness or any witness except parties18s'
may be used only to impeach: "[T] he law is clear that a prior
contradictory statement may be used to impeach the credibility of
a witness, but it is not substantive evidence of the truth of the
matter stated."'18 2 Since they are not offered as proof of the matters therein, prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay. 13 3 Although there has been much discussion of the substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements 34 and the modern trend appears to
be in favor of such use, the majority view remains that they may
35
only be used for purposes of impeachment.
The judicial discretion rule has a significant advantage over the
strict foundational rule in that the discretionary rule is designed
to circumvent the typical problem situations the strict rule generates, e.g., "the witness leaving the courthouse."', Although the
ordinary witness is to be protected by the operation of the strict
131. See Section IVB of this comment (beginning at note 150) infra.
132. Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 645, 139 A.2d 663, 666
(1965).
To the same effect, see Groh v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 271 A.2d
265, 268, 441 Pa. 345, 351 (1970); Crawford v. Manhatten Life Ins. Co., 208
Pa. Super. 150, 162, 221 A.2d 877, 884 (1966). This principle has very strong
roots in Pennsylvania and is repeated many times throughout the cases
dealing with impeachment of ordinary witnesses. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 542 n.1, 260 A.2d 773, 778 n.3 (1968); Bizich, supra
at 645, 139 A.2d at 666 and cases cited n.1; Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69,
73, 157 A.2d 56, 58 (1960); Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 166, 130 A.2d
150, 153 (1954).
133. See note 22 supra.
134. See McCoRMIcK §§ 43, 251; 3A WIGmoRM
§ 1018; Carnovale, The
Evidentiary Use of a Witness: Prior Extrajudicial Statement, 39 U. DET.
L.J. 393 (1962) (how to get substantive effect); Ladd, Some Observations
on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 249-51
(1967). The theory behind giving substantive effect to the prior inconsistent statement is based in the fact that the declarant is in court, and hence
subject to cross-examination. The hearsay rule is thus satisfied. Id. "A
statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony." FEDERAL RULE 801(d) (1) (A).
The other modern codifications take a similar stance. UNIFORM RULE 63 (1);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1968). The implication is that if extrinsic evidence is permitted by the exercise of judicial discretion because the declarant is not present, the extrinsic evidence would only have impeaching
effect.
135. 3A WIGMORE § 1018 & n.3.
136. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.

rule, such a witness usually has little interest in the suit and is
therefore less likely to recall past utterances. Hence, the ordinary
witness is also more likely to generate the awkward problems which
the discretionary rule was designed to resolve. Under the judicial
discretion rule, the foundation must ordinarily be laid, 8 7 but where
the ordinary witness is not available to be recalled, and omission
of the evidence would, according to the circumstances, work a hardship on the impeaching party when he is in no way to blame, the
rule permits the court to use its discretion and receive the impeaching evidence. 188 The only reasonable course is to balance the
equities as each such awkward situation presents itself.
The judicial discretion rule also applies to the testimony of an
ordinary witness given by way of his deposition, which is admissible
in lieu of his presence 1 9 so far as it conforms to the rules of evidence. 140 As in the case of oral testimony, the "ordinary deponent"
may be impeached by proof of prior inconsistent statements. 14 1 The
deposition may be impeached in two ways, either by evidence of
inconsistencies raised within the deposition itself by the deponent's
answers to questions asked by the impeaching party or by extrinsic
proof. Typically, a deposition is taken well before the action comes
to trial and many circumstances may intervene, making the witness
unable to give oral testimony. 142 If the impeaching party was
aware that the deponent had made inconsistent statements at the
time the deposition was taken, failure to lay the foundation in the
deposition may bar the offer of extrinsic proof at the trial." 8 However, the deponent may make an inconsistent statement subsequent
to the taking of the deposition or the existence of the inconsistent
statement might not be discovered until well after the deponent
becomes unavailable. Under such circumstances the strict foundational rule would preclude the opportunity to impeach at the trial
and thereby work an obvious hardship upon the impeaching party.
Indeed,
where, as in this case, the witnesses have been already examined under a rule or a commission at a distant place,
preparatory to the trial, it would often be difficult to foresee, sometimes impossible to foreknow, the questions to be
put to the witness on cross-examination in order to lay
ground to contradict him. Indeed in such cases unworthy
witnesses might be purposely examined under a rule at a
distance in order to prevent the ground from being laid.
137. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
139. PA. R. Civ. P. 4020(a) (3).
140. PA. R. Civ. P. 4020(a).
141. See Cronkite v. Texler, 187 Pa. 100, 41 A. 22 (1898); Rothrock v.
Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108 (1879); Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460 (1872) (deposition
impeached by deposition of another witness); Smith v. Winger, 3 Walker
138 (Pa. 1880); Baldi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 18 Pa. Super. 559 (1902).
142. See note 140 supra.
143. Cronkite v. Texler, 187 Pa. 100, 107, 41 A. 22 (1898). Cf. Walden
v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460, 463 (1872).
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...
It would be unjust to the party in such a case to
deprive him of the opportunity of contradicting unworthy
witnesses. We are therefore of opinion that those decisions
of our own court are to be preferred which hold the question is one of sound discretion in the judge trying the cause
upon the circumstances before him. 14
The superiority of the judicial discretion rule is nowhere more
amply demonstrated than where the credibility of a deposition is
at issue.
As the judicial discretion rule is designed to accommodate itself
to the peculiar facts of each distinct case, it is predictably elusive.
One court, in speaking of the exercise of discretion under the rule
stated:
The very term itself, standing alone and unsupported by
circumstances, imparts the exercise of judgment, wisdom,
and skill, as contradistinguished from unthinking folly,
heady violence, and rash injustice. When technically employed in legal instruments, its proper acceptation is inseparable from the idea of dispassionate conclusion,
having
145
due regard to the rights and interests of others.'
Of necessity, the discretion must be broad so as to permit an
equitable determination upon all the circumstances before the
court. It is thus not surprising that a predication of abuse of discretion by a trial court is to be found in but one case, and within
the dissent at that.1 4 Another interesting result which is the consequence of the scope of discretion is to be found in Commonwealth
v. Dennison.1 4 7 There, a defense witness who had given exculpating testimony had left the courthouse without having been asked
144. Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460, 463-64 (1872).
145. Parshall v. Passmore, 15 Pa. 295, 304 (1850).
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with the law upon
the facts and circumstances before the court after hearing and due
consideration.
In re Philadelphia Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 326, 32 A.2d 199, 204 (1943).
146. Commonwealth v. Carter, 187 Pa. Super. 159, 166, 144 A.2d 493, 497
(1958) (Watkins, J., dissenting). The prosecution's sole witness had told
variant stories at the present trial and defendant's prior trial on substantially similar (but not identical) federal narcotics charges. The trial court
prevented the defendant from introducing the federal court stenographer
to testify (the notes had not been transcribed because the defendant had
been acquitted) as a foundation was lacking. The majority of the Carter
court affirmed, ostensibly because the witness was essential to the Commonwealth's case. Id. at 166, 144 A.2d at 497. The dissent points out that
the nature of the impeaching evidence was of such a character that it was
an abuse of discretion to forbid the defendant from taking advantage of
the inconsistent statements of the witness: the Commonwealth could have
tried to recoup its losses by obtaining a transcript of the federal trial and
ferreting out errors. Id. at 168, 144 A.2d at 497.
147. 441 Pa. 334, 272 A.2d 180 (1972).

the foundational questions. The witness, who had been tried and
acquitted of the same murder, had given the police a statement,
at the time of his arrest, which was completely at variance with
his testimony. The statement was introduced, without objection,
to impeach the witness well after the opportunity to lay a foundation had been removed. The court exercised its discretion after the
trial, by granting a new trial partially on the basis of the unfairness of admitting the impeaching evidence without a foundation.14
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, refusing to interfere
with this exercise of discretion. 149 This decision ably demonstrates
the range of circumstances which are to be considered by the trial
court; not only unfairness which may be fostered upon the impeaching party by requiring a foundation, but also potential unfairness to the sponsoring party should a foundation be waived. It
is difficult to anticipate the awkward situations ordinary witnesses
will generate, and hence impossible to predict the manner in which
the rule will operate. Discretion is the key, and from its very nature its application is particular, and situation limited.
B. The Party Witness
A party to civil litigation occupies a special relation to the court
proceedings. He is a litigant directly interested in the subject matter of the suit.150 An ordinary witness is a commentator, present
merely to contribute his perspective of the totality of circumstances
forming the basis of the litigation. A party is an actor, present
at trial because of the totality of circumstances, and because of his
involvement, vitally interested in its outcome. Certain evidentiary
consequences flow from the intimate connexion a party bears to
the subject in question at trial. For example, he may be called
by his adversary as upon cross-examination, and the rules governing the scope of actual cross-examination are different for him than
for an ordinary witness. 5 1 The most interesting ramification of
a party's position is that he is inexorably bound by acts he performed or statements he made before trial which are apposite to
the question at hand.
The fact of his being so bound is the result of the well known
"party admission" exception to the hearsay rule, which provides
148. Id. at 336, 338, 272 A.2d at 180-81.
149. Id. at 338, 272 A.2d at 181-82.
150. 59 AM. JuR. 2d Parties § 7 (1971) citing Walker v. Philadelphia,
195 Pa. 168, 173, 45 A. 657 (1900); BLACK'S LAW Dc rIoNAIY 1275 (4th ed.
1951). "'Party' means any person who appears in a proceeding before an
agency who has a direct interest in the subject matter of such proceeding."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2(d) (1962).
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (1958). But the party must, in fact,
be called as upon cross-examination. In re Coultner, 406 Pa. 402, 409-10,
178 A.2d 742, 746 (1962). The scope of cross-examination is infinetely
broader for parties than for ordinary witnesses. E.g., Jess v. McMurry, 394
Pa. 526, 527, 147 A.2d 420, 421 (1959).
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that any statement or act by a party may be offered by his adversary to prove a relevant fact. 152 There are several different theories as to why admissions, although apparently hearsay, 1 3 are nonetheless receivable, and each seems to have merit.154 In any case,
an admission is a relevant circumstance to be considered as part
of the total transaction which led to the suit.15
As Wigmore points out,156 the practical effect of permitting the
receipt of admissions is that a party's germane statements or actions
will be offered only if they can be offered against him. No advocate
157
would offer an admission which supports the opponent-declarant.
As this is the case, it is important to regard the purpose for which
an admission is offered: "[I] t exhibits the quality of inconsistency
with the facts now asserted by [the party-declarant] in pleadings
or in testimony."1 8 There is no requirement that it be contradictory to any fact asserted by the party-declarant, including his own
testimony, if he takes the stand. 159 It must merely exhibit inconsistency with the party-declarant's present claim.160 Thus, where
152. Menger v. Silsbee, 64 Pa. 454, 457 (1870). Pennsylvania is apparently very closely aligned with the position espoused by UNIFORM RULE
63 (7). Comment, Admissibility of Hearsay-A Comparison of Some of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence and Pennsylvania Law, 4 VIL. L. Rsv. 117, 127
(1958). See Comment, Admissions, Confessions and Declarationsin Pennsylvania, 2 U. PiT. L. Rav. 180 (1936). See generally Morgan, Admissions,
1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 18 (1953).
153. See definition of hearsay, note 22 supra. See also McCoRMIcK §
246 n.47.
154. Wigmore's analysis is the one used for purposes of discussion in
the text of this comment. A party's admissions have the same status as
an ordinary witness' self-contradictions, with the broadened aspect of being
contradictory with the party's case, as put forth in his pleadings and testimonial evidence. Admissions are extra-judicial statements, and for Wigmore this means that a hearsay aspect is present, their being offered for
the truth of the matter stated. The hearsay rule itself is exclusionary: it
is designed to protect the party against whom the hearsay statement is offered when there has been no chance to cross-examine the declarant, and
there is little circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness. Clearly, these
considerations do not apply to admissions for a party is the declarant, and
there is no need for cross-examination since the party himself can always
take the stand to rebut the admission. The hearsay rule is satisfied as the
dangers it is designed to protect against are not extant. 4 WroMoRE § 1048.
Discussion of the other theories may be found at: McCoMicK § 262; E.
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENcE 265-66 (1962); Strahorn, The Hearsay
Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. Ray. 484, 564 at 569-88 (1937).
155. McCORMICK § 263.
156. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDFNCE § 1048(1) (b) (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited 4 WIOMORE].

157. Id. This requires little comment.
158. Id.
159. Practically, this is the same standard as applied to any other witness, but more far-reaching. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
160. 4 WGMoR. § 1048(1) (b).

A is asserted by the party-declarant in the presentation of his case,
and the party-declarant has said "other than A" (not necessarily
"not A"), this previous statement would be used as an admission.
Unlike the prior statement of an ordinary witness, a prior inconsistent statement of a party is usable not only for the purpose
of impeaching his credibility, 161 but also as substantive evidence
bearing upon the truth of the impeached party's claim. 16 2 They are
offered by one advocate as part of his case against the opponentdeclarant as probative of the truth of the opponent-declarant's
claim (or aspect thereof). Being substantive evidence, admissions
are entitled to great weight and hence have high evidentiary value
once proved. 163 For example, admissions made in a pleading are
conclusive on the pleader' 6 4 and other admissions are sufficient to
raise a prima facie case so as to defeat a compulsory nonsuit. 16 5
Thus an admission raises a question of not only whether the party
should be believed but also whether his case should be believed. 66
The paradigm admission is a prior statement made by a party
which is inconsistent with his present testimony, as where, after
an automobile mishap, the statement given the police is at variance
with the party's testimony at trial. 6 7 The declarant's prior inconsistent statement may, of course, be used against him, as with any
other admission; however, unlike a prior inconsistent statement
made by an ordinary witness, no foundation is required to present
extrinsic evidence of it.1 68

There are two obvious reasons why this

161. See cases cited at note 168 infra.
162. E.g., Rosenson v. Lyle, 436 Pa. 354, 361, 261 A.2d 78, 83 (1970);
Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 208, 180 A.2d 65, 67 (1962); Monaco v. Gula,
407 Pa. 522, 524, 180 A.2d 893, 894 (1962); Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa.
Super. 481, 485, 205 A.2d 680, 682-83 (1964); Poulson v. Gamble, 197 Pa.
Super. 300, 303, 178 A.2d 839, 841 (1962). See also cases cited at note 168
infra.
163. Lague v. Gallager, 133 Pa. Super. 570, 576, 3 A.2d 191, 193 (1939);
1 G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 75 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 1
HENRY].

164. See, e.g., Tops Apparel Mfg. Co. v. Rothman, 430 Pa. 583, 587, 244
A.2d 436, 438 (1968); Braceland v. Hughes, 184 Pa. Super. 4, 7, 133 A.2d
286, 287 (1957).
165. Percivalle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 89-90, 252 A.2d 702, 703 (1969). For
a delineation of the sources, and effects of admissions, see Meyer, The Use
of Prior Statements in Pennsylvania Civil Trials, 76 DIcK. L. REV. 631
(1972); 1 HENRY §§ 77-110.
166. See Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 573, 579 (1937). An interesting way of putting
this is to say that the party impeaches his own case as fixed by the pleadings. Id. To think in these terms is, however, to rely upon the non-hearsay theory of admissibility, rather than as admissions being an exception
to the hearsay rule. See note 154 supra. See generally 4 WIGMoPE §§ 104849; Strahorn, supra.
The substantive-impeaching use dichotomy of prior inconsistent statements of non-party witness is discussed in notes 132-36 and accompanying
text supra. It is clear that such a distinction is spurious with respect to
parties: admissions always have substantive import, irrespective of the
purpose for which they are introduced.
167. E.g., Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56 (1959).
168. Geelan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 246, 161 A.2d 595, 598
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should be the case. First, as an admission, it is substantive evidence
proved by independent testimony. Even if offered to impeach, it
is independently admissible as substantive evidence and is received
like any other direct evidence of a fact.169 Second, if the party
so chooses, he can always take the stand to explain, contradict or
reconcile the inconsistency and so no opportunity need be provided
170
by the opponent.
A pitfall in not recognizing the prior inconsistent statement
of a party as an admission is amply demonstrated -in Giles v.
Valentic. 171 There, each party sued the other for damages sustained in an auto collision between them. Valentic, in his crosscomplaint, claimed Giles was driving his auto at the time of the
collision. At the trial, Valentic and two others testified to facts
which led to an inference that someone other than Giles was
driving at the time of the collision. Giles offered Valentic's crosscomplaint "ostensibly for the purpose of impeaching Valentic,"1' 2
but the offer was refused because no proper foundation had been
laid. The jury found for the defendant in the respective suits and
Giles appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
(1962); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 644, 139 A.2d 663, 666
(1958); Hartley v. United Mine Workers, 381 Pa. 430, 113 A.2d 239, 241
,(1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Brinenstock, 358 Pa. 644, 654, 57
A.2d 884, 888-89 (1948); Kimble v. Wilson, 352 Pa. 269, 284, 42 A.2d 526,
530 (1945); Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 234 Pa. 223, 232, 83 A. 273,
276 (1912); Cronkite v. Texler, 187 Pa. 100, 107, 41 A. 22 (1898); Kreiter

v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59, 61 (1876); Brubaker's Adm'r v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83,
87 (1874); Keiter v. Miller, 111 Pa. Super. 594, 598, 170 A. 364, 365-66 (1934);

Bank v. Short, 59 Pa. Super. 166, 171 (1915); Bonar & Co. v. South Penn
Oil Co., 47 Pa. Super. 315, 317 (1911). See Miller v. Baler, 160 Pa. 172, 28

A. 648 (1894). But see Grezywacz v. Meszaros, 417 Pa. 51, 208 A.2d 237
(1965) (court's discretion); Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 49 A.2d 384 (1946)
(same). The general rule among the various jurisdictions is that no foundation is required to impeach party witnesses, although there are some
states which require the same foundation as with non-party witnesses. 4
JONES § 4 & n.39. FEDRAL RULE 613 (b) takes the majority (Pennsylvania's) stance by explicitly exempting party-witnesses from the operation
of the general foundational rule. The other modern codifications do not prescribe any course, so presumably the ordinary rules obtain. See UNIFORM
RU.E 22(b), 63(7); CAL. EvD. CODE §§ 770, 1220 (West 1968). In any case,
the admission must be proved in a satisfactory manner to have any effect
whatsoever. It is error for the trial court to limit an admission to an impeaching function. Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 208-09, 180 A.2d 65, 6768 (1962).
169. "[E] vidence may be considered for any purpose for which it is
competent." Morse Bougler Destructor Co. v. Arani, 376 Pa. 57, 65, 101 A.2d
705, 709 (1954). See McCORMICK § 37.
170. 4 WYGMOR § 1051. See McCORMICK § 37. See also 2 CONRAD §
1149; 4 JONES § 26:4.
171. 355 Pa. 108, 49 A.2d 384 (1946).
172. Id. at 110, 49 A.2d at 385.

ordinary Pennsylvania judicial discretion rule applied and that
there was no abuse of this discretion.17 8 It is interesting to note
that all but two of the cases cited as authority dealt with prior
inconsistent statements of ordinary witnesses. 17 4 Of the other two
cases, one dealt with a criminal defendant, 175 and the other with
a party, but the page cited as authority in the latter case stated
that admissions need no foundations, but that one might be required for an ordinary witness' prior inconsistent statement. 17
The failure of the Giles court to categorize the opponent-declarant's prior statement as an admission appears to be a mistaken decision. However, the one case since Giles which seems to have taken
the same position, that lack of a foundation may lead to exclusion
of extrinsic proof of a party's inconsistency, did not cite Giles for
authority, 177 and the cases which have heretofore cited Giles have
been cases involving impeachment of ordinary witnesses. 7 8 Giles
has never been expressly limited even though inconsistent with
Pennsylvania's rule regarding parties, although no harm has been
engendered to this date.
There is always the option of cross-examining the party-declarant as to his prior inconsistent statements and depending upon the
particular fact situation, it may be the superior trial strategy to
confront the party-declarant with the admission, thereby dispensing
with the need to prove it through extrinsic evidence. "In rare instances, a plaintiff may even be persuaded to adopt his contradictory statement as his final testimony and be nonsuited."' 79 But
attempting to lay a foundation is not a requirement, rather, it is,
so to speak, within the opponent-offeror's "sound discretion."
The prior inconsistent statements of parties thus do not fall
within Pennsylvania's general rule with respect to the foundational
requirement. The peculiar status given a party's prior inconsistent
statement as an admission makes the statement exempt from the
general rule as the function of offering the statement is altogether
different from that of an ordinary witness' prior inconsistent statement: it is substantive evidence, for whatever reason offered.
C. One's Own Witness
The basic tool a party has in developing his case is the group
173. Id. at 111, 49 A.2d at 385.
174. Id. at 110-11, 49 A.2d at 385. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 303
Pa. 104, 154 A. 287 (1931); Marshall v. Carr, 275 Pa. 86, 118 A. 621 (1922);
Caffery v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 261 Pa. 251, 104 A. 569 (1918);
Rabinowitz v. Silverman, 223 Pa. 139, 72 A. 378 (1909).
175. See Commonwealth v. Dilsworth, 289 Pa. 498, 137 A. 683 (1927).
176. Cronkite v. Texler, 187 Pa. 100, 107, 41 A. 22 (1898).
177. Gryzwacz v. Meszaros, 417 Pa. 51, 208 A.2d 237 (1965).
178. Commonwealth v. Carter, 187 Pa. Super. 159, 165, 144 A.2d 493, 496
(1958) (allocatur refused); Commonwealth v. Rothman, 168 Pa. Super. 163,
166 n.1, 77 A.2d 731, 733 n.1 (1951) (allocatur refused).
179. Meyer, The Use of Prior Statements in Pennsylvania Civil Trials,
76 DICK. L. Rsv. 631, 636-37 (1972).
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of witnesses he will call to prove the truth of the premises of his
argument. The problems generated by one's own witness can be
formidable. In most jurisdictions, a subset of the body of evidentiary rules is devoted to the way a party can approach and treat
his own witnesses' 8 0 The foundational requirement for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements is only a small aspect of that
subset. The broader question of impeachment by other means
(such as bias or reputation for veracity)' 8 ' and the more fundamental question of how to tell whether the witness called by a
party is, in fact, his own witness are outside the scope of this comment.18 2 This discussion will center around three species of this
genus of witness: adverse witnesses; necessary witnesses; and the
witness who was expected to be favorable but testifies otherwise. 8 3
The general rule with respect to impeaching one's own witness
180. See generally 1 HENRY § 531; 2 HENRY §§ 763-66, 801-03, 808, 810;
McCORM cK §§ 5-7, 26, 38; 3A WIGMOPX §§ 896-918.
181. See 4 JONES § 26:10-15; McCoRMIcK § 38; 3A WIoMoRE 900-01.
182. See 4 JONES § 26:13; SA WIoROPE §§ 909-13. See generally Ladd,
Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. Cin. L. REv.
69 (1936); Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 U. VA. L. REV. 996
(1963).
183. The topic of impeaching one's own witness is very interesting, but
unfortunately quite extensive so no attempt will be made to deal with all
possible nuances. In particular, the distinction between a witness expected
to be favorable but who turns hostile, and a hostile witness from the enemy
camp is left aside. In general, the Pennsylvania courts have seemed to treat
the hostility of a "friendly" witness as a special case of surprise: "[W]here
a party is surprised by the testimony of a witness who has turned hostile,
counsel may exercise the right of cross-examination of the witness or impeach his testimony by other witnesses." Commonwealth v. Bowers, 182
Pa. Super. 628, 632, 127 A.2d 806, 808 (1956). See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972); Commonwealth v. Settles, 442 Pa.
159, 275 A.2d 61 (1971); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401
(1940); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, 110 A. 158 (1919); 2 HENRY
§ 809. There have been cases which have permitted cross-examination on
the basis of hostility alone. United States v. Laurelli, 187 F. Supp. 30, 3536 (M.D. Pa. 1960) (court may direct cross-examination of a witness without a plea of surprise); Thomas v. Conemaugh Black Lick R.R., 133 F. Supp.
533, 542 (W.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 429 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548, 327 A.2d 653, 655 (1966) (need no plea of surprise
to cross-examine hostile witness); Commonwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super.
528, 544, 136 A.2d 166, 175 (1957); Commonwealth v. Joseph, 182 Pa. Super.
617, 623-24, 128 A.2d 121, 124 (1956). There have also been cases which
intimate a qualitative difference between cross-examination based upon
hostility, and cross-examination based upon surprise, viz., that in the former
the purpose of cross-examination is to refresh the recollection of the witness
as to his prior statements, whereas in the latter it is to impeach. See Shapman v. United States, 289 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1923); Fischer v. Hart, 149 Pa.
232, 24 A. 225 (1892); Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super.
500, 43 A.2d 571 (1943). For the purposes of this comment, impeachment
of a "friendly-hostile" witness will be assumed isomorphic to the surprise
exception to the general prohibitionary rule.

is that one may not.18 4 This rule was first voiced in Cofledge's
Triall s5 nearly 300 years ago:
Whatsoever witness you call, you call them as witnesses to
testify the truth for you; and if you ask them any questions, you must take what they have said as truth: Therefore you must not think to ask him any questions, and
afterward call another witness to disprove your own
witness. 18
As stated, the prohibition is broad, covering all types of impeachment: character; bias; interest; prior inconsistent statements. 8 7
Traditionally, three separate arguments have been advanced as
justification for the rule: the party is morally bound by the statements of his witness (this reason has been repudiated) ;18s the
party introducing a witness guarantees his general credibility (the
popular view);18s9 the party should not have the means to coerce
his own witness (the analytic view).'9
Pennsylvania is among those jurisdictions which adopted this
general prohibitionary rule, 91 the rationale being that "[a] s a general rule a party who produces a witness thereby holds him out
as being worthy of belief and will not be permitted to impeach his
general character or show contradictory statements made by him
on other occasions."192 But, as is the case with most other jurisdictions which have this rule, a large exception has been carved out:
under certain circumstances the prior inconsistent statement of
one's own witness may be used to impeach him. 193
The best known manifestation of this exception is directed
towards the "friendly witness" who the party has put on the stand
believing that he will provide some element of proof necessary to
that party's case. However, upon direct examination the witness
tells a new unexpected story. Such a happening is at best an annoyance and can easily upset the entire presentation of a case or
even destroy the case itself if the expected testimony was crucial.
184. 3A WIGMORE § 896. The modern codifications have eroded this rule.
A typical formulation is this: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him." FED AL Ruta 607. Accord,
CAL. Evi. CODE § 785 (West 1968); UNiromVi RuLE 20.
185. 8 How. St. Tr. 549 (1681).
186. Id. at 636. For a more detailed history of the prohibitionary rule,
see McCoRmucK § 38; 3A WIGMORE § 896; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own
Witness-New Developments, 4 U Cm L. REy. 69-76 (1936); Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 U. VA. L. Ray. 996, 997-99 (1963).
187. See MCCORMICK § 38; 3A WwMoRE §§ 900-04.
188. 3A WIGMORE § 897.
189. McCoamcK § 38; 3A WIGMORE § 898.
190. McCoRicK § 38; 3A WIGMORE § 899 (Wigmore believes this is
the sole purpose for the rule).
191. See People's Nat. Bank v. Hazard, 231 Pa. 552, 80 A. 1094 (1911);
Sterns v. Merchant's Bank, 53 Pa. 490 (1867).
192. The most recent enunciation is Commonwealth v. White, 447 Pa.
331, 338, 290 A.2d 246, 250 (1972). See 2 HEmY § 808 and cases cited n.58.
193. For Pennsylvania's approach, see the rest of this section infra. For
other jurisdictions, see McCoRMIcK § 38; 3A WIGMORE § 905.
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As there is no way to erase the damaging testimony from the mind
of the trier of fact, the only remedy available is impeachment of
the witness so as to lighten the weight of his testimony. The socalled "surprise" exception, which permits the party to do so, is
designed to prevent the injustice' 94 which clearly would be fostered
should the party be bound by testimony "where the witness unexpectedly testifies in a manner different from that which the
party, from statements made by the witness prior to trial, had been
led to expect he would testify."'195
There are two essential prerequisites necessary to impeach under this exception; surprise and damage. 19 6 The plea of surprise
is the foundation for requesting leave of the court to cross-examine
or impeach one's own witness. 19 7 It is made to the court at side
bar, and must immediately follow the unexpected testimony.19
The court then has discretion to sustain the plea, 199 needing only
to be satisfied that surprise exists.
2 01

20 0

The party, of course, must

in fact have been surprised:
disappointment 20 2 or a reply from
the witness of "I don't know" (contrary to counsel's expectation)
194. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, 363, 110 A. 158, 159 (1920).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548, 227 A.2d 653, 655 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Gurreri, 197 Pa. Super. 329, 332, 178 A.2d 808, 809 (1962).
195. 2 HENRY § 809.
196. To be entirely accurate, there is a third, materiality, but "[m] ateriality is not of great importance, since an attorney usually will not risk
antagonizing the jury by attempting to impeach his own witness on an irrelevant point, nor will a court ordinarily permit collateral issues to be raised."
Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 U. VA. L. REV. 996, 1001 (1963).
197. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). Contra, Commonwealth v. Gurreri, 197 Pa. Super. 329,
334, 178 A.2d 808, 809-10 (1962). See note 215 infra.
198. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943).
199. Id. This discretion is reviewable ifabused. E.g., Commonwealth

v. Conard, 206 Pa. Super. 33, 42, 211 A.2d 14, 19, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920
(1966); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, 363, 110 A. 158, 159 (1920);
McNeary v. Reading, 150 Pa. 611, 616, 25 A. 57, 58 (1892).
200. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bowers, 182 Pa. Super. 628, 633-34, 127 A.2d
806, 809 (1956).
201. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). 'Surprised'isused in the sense "taken (captured) unawares." Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 123 A-2d 187

(1957); Commonwealth v. Smith, 178 Pa. Super. 251, 115 A.2d 782 (1955);
Annot. 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931); see also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa.
21, 244 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969) (rehabilitating witness
may be impeached upon a plea of surprise).
202. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133
A.2d 187 (1957); Commonwealth v.Joseph, 182 Pa. Super. 617, 128 A.2d 121
(1955); Commonwealth v. Netkowicz, 170 Pa. Super. 125, 84 A.2d 234
(1951).

is not sufficient.20 3 If counsel knows that the witness has changed
his story, the plea of surprise is not available when the witness
gives the inconsistent statement in his testimony. Furthermore, the
claim of surprise cannot be a pretext so as to get the impeaching
statement (the statement made to counsel) before the trier of
fact.20 4 If counsel knows the witness has changed his story, he can
prevent being bound by the changed story by not calling the witness.
When the plea of surprise is made, it must include a recitation
of the prior (expected) statement and show the right of counsel
to have relied upon it. 2 05 The practical effect of this latter requirement is that prior oral statements must have been made in the
party's or counsel's presence-there is no right to rely upon a third
party's report of what the witness would say.20 6

Statements made

by the witness in writing and subscribed to by him, or testimony
under oath need not have been made in the presence of either the
party or counsel. 207 The second prerequisite is, of course, that there
be damage in that the party was prejudiced because of reliance on
the witness and his prior statement. 208 In Seldon v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co, 20 9 the classic Pennsylvania case dealing with the
203. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). "I don't remember" is insufficiently prejudicial. Id.;
Commonwealth v. Knudson, 443 Pa. 412, 415, 278 A.2d 881, 883 (1971);
Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 443, 218 A.2d 574, 576 (1966). See Katz
v. Ross, 216 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1955); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1956). See
also note 208 infra.
204. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 511, 43
A.2d 571, 578 (1943). See Commonwealth v. Turner, 359 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d
187 (1957); Fischer v. Hart, 149 Pa. 232, 24 A. 225 (1892); In re Nagy, 162
Pa. Super. 388, 82 A.2d 591 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Wickett, 20 Pa. Super.
350 (1902). But see Commonwealth v. Joseph, 182 Pa. Super. 617, 128 A.2d
121 (1956); 3A WiGMORE §§ 896-903.
205. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505-06, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). See Commonwealth v. Smith, 178 Pa. Super. 251, 115
A.2d 782 (1958).
206. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505-06, 43
A.2d 571, 575 (1943). See, e.g., Chuplis v. Alamenda Coal Co., 192 Pa.
Super. 76, 159 A.2d 520 (1960) (allocatur refused).
207. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super, 500, 505-06, 43
A.2d 571, 575-76 (1943). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balchan, 433 Pa. 491,
252 A.2d 378 (1969) (written statement); Commonwealth v. Carr, 137 Pa.
Super. 546, 10 A.2d 133 (1940) (testimony before grand jury).
208. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 509, 43
A.2d 571, 577 (1943). See, e.g., Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 218
A.2d 574 (1966); Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187
(1957); Fischer v. Hart, 149 Pa. 232, 24 A. 225 (1892).
[O]ur courts have been loathe to allow cross-examination for the
purpose of impeachment by use of prior inconsistent statements
when a witness states that he does not know or that he cannot remember. This is so for the reason that such an in court declaration
does not harm the calling party nor aid the opposing party.
Commonwealth v. Knudsen, 443 Pa. 412, 414-15, 278 A.2d 881, 882-83 (1973).
See Commonwealth v. Bynum, 454 Pa. 9, 12, 309 A.2d 545, 547 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Dancer, 452 Pa. 221, 226, 305 A.2d 364, 366 (1973).
209. 157 Pa. Super. 500, 43 A.2d 571 (1945). See Litman, Evidence, 27
U. Prrr. L. REv. 996, 1001 (1963).
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surprise exception, the court set forth the fundamental requirement
that the prior statement be contradictory or inconsistent with the
present testimony, for "if it is not contradictory or inconsistent,
there is nothing about which to be surprised.1 210 If the plea is
sustained, the court has discretion to permit cross-examination as
to the antecedent statement, and to thus lay the foundation for impeachment by extrinsic evidence if the witness does not recant his
present testimony. 211. The evidence obtained on cross examination
may be used only for the purposes of impeachment, substantive use
212
being forbidden.
As the only inconsistent statement of one's own witness which
218
may serve for impeachment purposes is the one which surprises,
it is manifest that the general rule of judicial discretion with respect to the foundation for extrinsic proof is inapplicable. Counsel
must plead surprise at once, 214 thereby eliminating his option of
letting the statement go and trying to impeach purely by extrinsic
evidence. If he does not plead surprise, the general prohibitionary
rule is operant. If he pleads surprise but fails to cross-examine
the plea would undoubtedly be considered vacuous by the court
and the subsequent offer of extrinsic evidence refused. If truly
surprised, counsel's only viable course is to attempt to draw the
prior statement out of the witness and impeach by cross-examination, thereby laying the foundation for the prior inconsistent statement. If the witness fails to impeach himself upon cross-examination as to the prior statement, then extrinsic evidence is admissible
to demonstrate inconsistency. Thus, the operation of the general
prohibitionary rule appears to make the foundation mandatory, no
210. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 506, 43
A.2d 571, 576 (1943).
211. Id. at 507, 43 A.2d at 576. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brabham,
433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1968); Koller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 41
Pa. Super. 48, 50 (1909) (extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement
admissible).
212. Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 507-08, 43
A.2d 571, 576-77 (1943). See Commonwealth v. Crews, 429 Pa. 16, 22, 239
A.2d 350, 354 (1968); Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 503-04, 230
A.2d 449, 450-51 (1967) (failure to properly instruct is reversible error);
Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 442, 218 A.2d 574, 576 (1966); Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 257, 133 A.2d 187, 195 (1957); Commonwealth
v. Mattera, 151 Pa. Super. 135, 138, 30 A.2d 168, 169 (1943). The modern
codifications reject this position by giving substantive import to prior inconsistent statements. See notes 133-34 supra. See also McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L.
REV. 573 (1947).
213. See notes 196-207 and accompanying text supra.
214. Id. See also Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness, 4 U. CHI.
L. REv. 69, 84-86 (1936).

matter how routinely the surprise exception is granted.2-1
Another category of witnesses who may be impeached even
though called by the impeaching party are witnesses who are called
as if upon cross-examination, persons adversely interested in the
question at issue.216 The right to call a witness as upon crossexamination, and the preconditions to that right are provided for
by statute in Pennsylvania, 217 which states (in part):
In any civil proceeding, . . . a party to the record .

.

. or

any other person whose interest is adverse to the party calling him as a witness, may be compelled by the adverse
party to testify as if under cross-examination, subject to
the rules applicable to witnesses under cross-examination,
and the adverse party calling such witness shall not be
,11
concluded by his testimony ....
The initial hurdle provided by the statute is successful characterization of the witness as being "adversely interested." The statute
expressly provides that persons for whose immediate benefit the
suit is brought or defended 21 9 and the directors or officers of corporations may be called as on cross-examination. However, any other
witness that a party would like to call has to come under the
"party" or "persons with adverse interests" provisions, and as to
the latter, Pennsylvania courts have been conservative in their
finding.220 Keeping in mind that it is the interest and not merely
215. It is necessary to indicate that there has been a line of cases which
prima facie deny this statement. They all say in effect that the general
prohibitionary rule "has been considerably relaxed to prevent injustice and
the tendency of the courts is to permit parties to show the truth without
strict regard to technicalities." Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 588,
307 A.2d 245, 247 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 452 Pa. 221, 225-26, 305
A.2d 364, 366 (1973); Commonwealth v. Knudson, 443 Pa. 412, 414, 278 A.2d
881, 882 (1971); Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548, 227 A.2d 653,
655 (1967); Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 44-45, 122 A. 158 (1923);
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, 363, 110 A. 158, 159 (1920); Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 16, 70 A. 275, 278 (1908); Gantt v. Cox &
Sons, 199 Pa. 208, 217, 48 A. 992 (1901); Morris v. Guffey & Queen, 188
Pa. 534, 540, 41 A. 731, 732 (1898); Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super.
160, 173, 188 A.2d 784, 791 (1963); Commonwealth v. Gurreri, 197 Pa. Super.
329, 334, 178 A.2d 808, 809-10 (1962); Commonwealth v. Joseph, 182 Pa.
Super. 617, 623, 128 A.2d 121, 124 (1956). This goes to the relaxation of
the prohibitionary rule via the various exceptions which permit cross-examination and subsequent impeachment and not to relaxation of the procedures to be followed to obtain permission, i.e., there still must be adequate
ground to cross-examine before permission will be granted to proceed and
subsequently impeach. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 588, 307
A.2d 245, 247 (1973); Commonwealth v. Knudson, 443 Pa. 412, 414-15, 278
A.2d 581, 582-83 (1973). Hence, cross-examination is a prerequisite to impeaching by means of extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements and
permission (alternately, a ruling by the court permitting) is a prerequisite
to cross-examination.
216. The calling party is "at liberty to call witnesses to impeach [the
witness'] testimony and to show, if possible, that his statements were not
true." Durmore v. Padden, 262 Pa. 436, 439, 105 A. 559, 560 (1918).
217. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 28, § 381 (1958).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. For example, ordinary agents, even if they stand to be liable, have
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the testimony which must be adverse, 221 the test is strict:
The true test of the interest of a witness is that he will
either gain or lose, as the direct legal effect of the judgment. .

. It must be a present, certain and vested inter-

est, and not an interest uncertain, remote or contingent.
222

The interest must be in the immediate effect of the particular suit,
223
and not in future possible actions or circumstances.
Once having satisfied the adversity criterion, the calling party
may cross-examine the adverse witness, using leading questions to
elicit the information necessary for the development of the party's
case. If the adverse witness is a party-opponent, the scope of the
examination is clear: the witness may be examined as to any matter pertinent to the case.2 24 However, if the adverse witness is not
a party, the scope of the examination is not clearly defined. The
scant authority available indicates that a non-party witness, once
qualified as adverse, is to be treated as a party-opponent 225 and
therefore could also be examined as to any germane matter. This
is the only reasonable posture in light of Pennsylvania's adherence
to the "scope of direct" rule; 226 if the non-party adverse witness
been held not to qualify under the statute. Brown v. Popky, 413 Pa. 236,

196 A.2d 638, 646 (1964). Cf. Puskarich v. Zembo Temple, 412 Pa. 313, 319,
194 A.2d 208, 212 (1963).
221. Suckling v. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mutual Cas.
Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 503, 507, 233 A.2d 279, 282 (1967); In re Gelb Estate, 425
Pa. 117, 121, 228 A.2d 367, 369 (1967); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Szabo,
391 Pa. 272, 280-81, 138 A.2d 85, 89 (1957); In re Hendrickson Estate, 388
Pa. 39, 45, 130 A.2d 143, 147 (1957). See Agate v. Dunlevy, 398 Pa. 26, 29,
156 A.2d 530, 532 (1959) (grounds for new trial if court abuses discretion
in permitting cross-examination).
222. Braine v. Spalding, 52 Pa. 247, 248-49 (1866). Accord, e.g., Suckling v. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mutual Cas. Co., 426 Pa. 503,
507, 233 A.2d 279, 282 (1967); Dinger v. Friedman, 279 Pa. 8, 14-15, 123
A. 641, 643 (1924); In re Dillon, 269 Pa. 234, 240, 111 A. 919, 921 (1920);
Cohen v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 286, 288 (1901).
223. Billow v. Billow, 360 Pa. 343, 347, 61 A.2d 817, 819 (1948). See
Suckling v. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mutual Cas. Co., 426 Pa.
503, 233 A.2d 279 (1967); Rudella v. Lefland, 213 Pa. Super. 305, 247 A.2d
793 (1968).
224. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (1958).

An adverse party called upon

cross-examination may not have his own case developed on examination
following the calling party's cross-examination. E.g., In re Rogen's Estate,
404 Pa. 205, 213, 171 A.2d 177, 181 (1961); Kline v. Kachman, 360 Pa. 396,
404, 61 A.2d 825, 830 (1948). See Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83, 87 (1874).
225. "The purpose of the act is to make [the adverse witness] subject
to cross-examination like an individual litigant under similar circumstances." Manor Nat'l Bank v. Lowery, 242 Pa. 559, 565, 89 A. 678, 679
(1914').
226. See Goehring v. Diamond Mill Co., 461 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 437 Pa. 563, 263 A.2d 382 (1970); Woodland v.

was not so considered, there would be no direct examination from
which to plot the perimeter of cross, and the characterization as
"adverse" would not aid the calling party. Due to the strict requirements which a non-party must fulfill before he may be called
as an adverse witness, it seems that he should be treated as a party
on the stand.
Recognizing that the calling party will probably receive a mixture of favorable and unfavorable information, the statute provides
that "the adverse party calling such witnesses shall not be concluded by his testimony .... ,,221 The courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean that the calling party is not bound
by the adverse witness' testimony to the extent that it is contradicted, i.e., the calling party is at liberty to contradict any portion
of the adverse witness' testimony. 22 Along with direct contradiction as to facts, impeachment by prior inconsistent statements of
the adverse witness germane to the inquiry are open to
exploration
229
upon cross-examination and through subsequent proof.

Since all adverse witnesses are to be treated as if they were
parties, no foundation is required for extrinsic proof of the prior
inconsistent statements.2 30 The calling party and not the court has
the discretion as to whether a foundation should be laid, and may
prove the prior inconsistency without one if he so chooses. 2 "1
The remaining category of one's own witnesses which yields
an exception to the general prohibitionary rule is that of necessary
witnesses, those witnesses a party must call to prove an element
of his case but who don't qualify as "friendly" witnesses. Even
though adverse witnesses may be impeached under a separate exception, they provide a good exemple of this species: a particular
adverse witness has knowledge of some fact necessary to the development of the calling party's case, so he must be called but could
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 428 Pa. 379, 238 A.2d 593 (1968); Okothewicz v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 397 Pa. 303, 155 A.2d 192 (1959).
227. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 28, § 381 (1958). See, e.g., Amato v. Landy,
416 Pa. 115, 204 A.2d 914 (1964); Kline v. Kachman, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d
825 (1949); Mathews v. Derencin, 360 Pa. 349, 62 A.2d 6 (1949).
228. Piowoz v. Iannocone, 406 Pa. 588, 594, 178 A.2d 707, 710 (1962);
Kline v. Kachman, 360 Pa. 396, 403-04, 61 A.2d 825, 829 (1949); Burke v.
Kennedy, 286 Pa. 344, 349, 133 A. 508, 509 (1926); Mack v. Furphy, 172 Pa.
Super. 226, 228, 92 A.2d 699, 700 (1953). The testimony may be contradicted
not only by testimony of other witnesses, but also by circumstances, or its
own intrinsic improbability. E.g., Piowoz v. Iannacone, 406 Pa. 588, 59495, 178 A.2d 707, 710 (1962); Mathews v. Derencin, 360 Pa. 349, 354, 62 A.2d
6, 8 (1949); Bagdanoff v. Manis, 346 Pa. 243, 245, 30 A.2d 321, 322 (1943).
229. Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa. 344, 348, 133 A. 508, 510 (1926); Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83, 87 (1874). The inconsistent statement goes only
to impeachment. Dunmore v. Padden, 262 Pa. 436, 105 A. 559, 560 (1918).
230. It has been held that where a non-party is directly and beneficially
interested, prior statements concerning material facts have the character of
admissions and are receivable as substantive evidence. Geelan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 246, 161 A.2d 595, 598 (1960). As to the foundational
rule pertaining to parties, see Section IVB of this comment (beginning at
note 150) supra.
231. Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83, 87 (1874).
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hardly be characterized as "friendly." The class of adverse witnesses clearly overlaps the class of necessary23 2witnesses; however not
all necessary witnesses qualify as adverse.
Other than adverse witnesses, the two subclasses of necessary
witnesses are those witnesses a party is required by law to call and
hostile witnesses. 233 A particular witness can fall into either or
both of these subclasses since they are not mutually exclusive. It
is assumed herein that they are distinct because each subclass
standing alone qualifies under the necessary witness exception to
the general prohibitionary rule. In the discussion that follows, the
analysis shall be focused upon necessary witnesses who do not also
have the characteristics of an adverse witness.
Sometimes a party is required by law to call certain witnesses
to prove an element of a case. Two well known examples are subscribing witnesses to a will 2 34 and, when proof of death is required,
the physician who signed the requisite certificates. 35 It has been
recognized that the calling party is working under a handicap:
circumstances dictate that a particular witness be called, and the
calling party cannot be said to be truly sponsoring that witness nor
vouching for his general credibility. 236 If the calling party had
had a choice of whom to call, then the general prohibitionary rule's
theory would be operative,2 37 "[b]ut it is to be borne in mind that
he had no option in that regard." 2 5 Impeaching by proof of prior
-9
inconsistent statements is thus appropriate. 3
Unfortunately the cases are generally not helpful on the question of the foundational requirements for extrinsic proof, being
more concerned with declaring the fact that the exception exists
232. See notes 217-19 and accompanying text supra.
233. This is the witness who is known to be hostile to the callling
party's cause, and not the friendly witness who turns hostile on the stand.
See note 183 supra.
234. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 31321 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972).
235. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 753 (7) (1971) (accident and health insurance policy must have proof of death clause).
236. Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa. 344, 350, 133 A. 508, 510 (1926); Morris
v. Guffey & Queen, 188 Pa. 534, 540, 41 A. 731, 732 (1898).
237. See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
238. Baldi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. 275, 289 (1904).
239. Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151, 160 (1848) (subscribing witness to a
will); Seldon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 511, 43 A.2d
571, 578 (1943); Baldi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. 275, 28990 (physician who made out proof of death). See Sack v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 115 Pa. Super. 430, 175 A. 733 (1934) (allocatur refused); Monaghan
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 90 Pa. Super. 392 (1927) (allocatur refused);
South Side Trust Co. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 74 Pa. Super. 566 (1920); Lewis
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 57 Pa. Super. 406 (1914). See generally 2 HENRY
§ 810; 4 JONES § 26:14; MCCORMCK § 38; 3 A WIGMORE § 917.

than with the mechanics of impeaching. Two early cases do approach the foundational question, but they do not agree: in one
it is held that leading questions as to the prior statements should
240
be permitted as well as subsequent proof of the inconsistencies;
in the other the court endorses the party's offer of proof of prior
inconsistencies without indicating whether a foundation was laid,
or even necessary.2 41 Where a required witness is concommitantly
hostile and adverse, he may be treated by the rules accorded to
either of those characterizations 242 and no problem exists. Major
difficulty is encountered when the required witness is neither adverse nor hostile. Perhaps in practice there is no "pure" required
witness who is not in one or the other camp, but such is possible
and there are no easy analogies to other types of witnesses. By
definition he is neither adverse nor hostile. There is also little
chance of surprise (unless the witness arbitrarily changes his story)
as the calling party would probably be aware of any inconsistencies
before trial.243 Moreover, the form of question used by the calling
party to elicit the required information is of little consequence since
the calling party has little or no control over the contents of the
testimony. 244 There is no reason why leading questions should not
be permitted and the "ordinary witness" rule 245 regarding foundations for extrinsic proof of any prior inconsistent statements applied. Germane prior inconsistencies could be explored and the
witness would be afforded the protection of the judge's discretion
as to having the opportunity to explain or reconcile the inconsistencies before extrinsic proof would be available.
The other subclass of necessary witnesses is that of hostile
witnesses.
There is a well settled exception to the rule that a party
may not discredit his own witnesses. Where one is compelled to go into the camp of the enemy to establish2 46
a fact
essential to recovery, he may contradict such witness.
The theory is once again that merely because the calling party is
forced to put the hostile witness on the stand, he does not vouch
for the credibility of the witness in any respect. 247 It is well estab-

lished that it is within the trial court's discretion to permit cross240. Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151, 160 (1848).
241. Baldi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. 275, 286, 288
(1908).
242. See notes 230-31 and accompanying text supra; notes 248-49 and
accompanying text infra.
243. See text accompanying notes 197-215 supra. In a case of true surprise, the ordinary rules would apply, although one would not expect a necessary witness to tell different stories at different times, as any inconsistency in such a case would tend to be deliberate.
244. See Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa. 344, 350, 133 A. 508, 510 (1926)
(only living witness who could testify to the facts was the defendant).
245. See Section IVA of this comment (beginning at note 131) supra.
246. Reese v. Thasoff, 108 Pa. Super. 378, 390, 165 A. 672, 676 (1933)
(allocatur refused).
247. Morris v. Guffey & Queen, 188 Pa. 534, 540, 41 A. 731 (1898).
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examination and impeachment of hostile witnesses. 248 But no authorities have been found which indicate the necessary steps for
impeaching such witnesses by prior inconsistent statements.
It has been said that the purpose of cross-examining a hostile
witness is to extract the desired testimony, 249 and if some different
testimony is forthcoming, to refresh his recollection by means 2of0
his prior inconsistent statements, posed by leading questions.
Seemingly, the foundational rule for impeachment of a hostile witness by his prior inconsistent statements should be the same as the
rule for impeachment of a party's friendly witness who surprises.
As in the case of surprise, 251 a sincere desire not to be bound by
the witness' testimony would ordinarily require immediate exploration of inconsistencies through cross-examination. Even though the
reasons behind the two exceptions to the general prohibitionary rule
are distinguishable, the qualitative effect is similar because of the
fact of being called as one's own witness: a similar rule would seem
to be in order. It is to be remembered, however, that one party's
hostile witness is his adversary's friendly witness; the rules pertaining to the ordinary witness25 2 would once again be invoked after the adversary has put the witness on the stand for direct.
In summary, the ordinary witness rule of judicial discretion as
to the necessity of a foundation for extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement seemingly does not apply to the various categories of one's own witnesses because of the very nature of this
type of witness. The testimony given by an ordinary witness called
by the opposing party is the adversary's evidence while testimony
248. United States v. Carter, 295 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa.), afJ'd, 417 F.2d
229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 999 (1970); Commonwealth v. Settles,
442 Pa. 159, 162, 275 A.2d 61, 63 (1971); Gantt v. Cox & Sons, 199 Pa. 208,
217, 48 A. 992 (1901).
See Commonwealth v. Staine, 204 Pa. Super. 319
204 A.2d 664 (1966) (allocatur refused); Ross v. Houck, 184 Pa. Super. 448,
136 A.2d 160 (1957); Lemak v. Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. Super. 62, 23 A.2d 359
(1941) (allocatur refused); Fetterolf v. Yellow Cab Co., 139 Pa. Super. 463,
11 A.2d 516 (1939). This is particularly so when the witness would be reluctant to testify against the party he is friendly towards. Commonwealth
v. Settles, 442 Pa. 159, 162, 295 A.2d 61, 63 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bruno,
316 Pa. 394, 403, 175 A. 518, 521 (1934); Commonwealth v. Gurreri, 197 Pa.
Super. 329, 333, 178 A.2d 808, 810 (1962). See generally 2 CONRAD § 1135;
2 HENY § 809; 4 JoNEs §§ 26: 11-12; McCoRMIcK §§ 7, 26. A hostile witness is neither a party nor an adverse witness, and so it follows that, like
an ordinary witness, proof of prior inconsistent statements would have only
impeaching value.
249. Seldon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 510, 43 A.2d 571,
577-78 (1943).
250. Fischer v. Hart, 149 Pa. 232, 235, 24 A. 225 (1892). Accord, Seldon
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 510, 43 A.2d 571, 577-78 (1943).
251. See notes 197-215 and accompanying text supra.
252. See Section IVA of this comment (beginning at note 131) supra.

given by one's own witness, irrespective of which "camp" he comes
from, is one's own evidence. This latter fact would seem to require
immediate exploration of inconsistencies as one cannot be ambivalent about the case he presents. The overriding consideration is
the general prohibitionary rule that one cannot impeach his own
witness which creates a dichotomy of "my witnesses" and "my
enemy's witnesses." Special rules thus apply in two of the subclasses discussed: mandatory foundations in the cases of surprise
and hostile witnesses; "cross-examiner's discretion" (no foundational requirement) in the case of adverse witnesses. The final subclass, "pure" required witnesses, is an appropriate subject of the
ordinary witness rule, and thus is the sole subclass to fall within
Pennsylvania's "general" rule.
D. Other Witnesses and Other Considerations
The most notable aspect of the hearsay declarant as a testimonial asserter is that he is not present in court. The effect of
his testimony, however, is as profound as testimony delivered by
a witness present in court, for if the declarant's out of court statement can be found to be within one of the numerous exceptions
to the hearsay rule, the statement will be given substantive effect.
The testimonial nature of the hearsay declarant's statement leaves
him open to impeachment the same as any other witness253 and
the majority view is that the declarant may be impeached by proof
254
of prior inconsistent statements.
It is also the majority view that no foundation is necessary to
impeach a hearsay declarant by extrinsic evidence. 255 The rationale
behind this position is straightforward: the hearsay declarant is
not available for cross-examination and the foundation cannot be
laid. A rule requiring a foundation would deprive the non-sponsoring party "of two of his most important weapons of defense at one
and the same time, cross-examination and prior self-contradiction."256 The hardships entailed by any rule other than free admission of prior inconsistent statements of the declarant are not
only unreasonable, but also clearly unjustifiable. The few Pennsylvania cases which discuss impeachment of a hearsay declarant make
no mention of any foundational requirement,257 so presumably the
253. MCCoRMICK § 37; 3A WIGMORE § 884.
254. 4 JorqEs § 26:6; McCoRMIcK § 37; 3A WIGMORE § 1033. The modern codifications take this position: "Evidence of a statement or conduct
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is
not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." FEDmiAu RULE 806. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1202
(West 1968); UNIFORM RULE 63.
255. See 3A WIGMORE § 1033 & n.1.
256. Id. at § 1033.
257. See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128 A. 83 (1925) (dying declaration); Commonwealth v. Bryson, 276 Pa. 566, 120 A. 552 (1923)
(prior statements of declarant inadmissible as purpose of offer not given).
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free admissibility of proof of prior inconsistent statements is well
settled.
A somewhat different case is encountered when the function
of opinions are examined. The rule in Pennsylvania 258 as well as
other jurisdictions is that a witness whose opinion is receivable in
testimony may be impeached by his prior inconsistent statements
of opinion as to the same matter.25 9 The opinion admitted in testimony will be based upon the same facts as the prior inconsistent
opinion, and there is thus an easy analogy to the ordinary case of
testimony as to facts and prior inconsistent statements of the same
facts. 260 The rule is less well settled where the present testimony
is to facts, and the prior inconsistent statements is of opinion.
The admissibility of prior opinions inconsistent with testimony
as to facts has apparently never been considered in Pennsylvania.
Some courts hold that the general rule prohibiting opinions operates to prevent impeachment in this manner.2 6 1 These courts overlook the fact that the character of the impeaching statement should
be of little consequence. Except in the case of parties, inconsistent
statements of a witness are offered to demonstrate the fact of incon26 2
sistency, and not as testimonial assertions.
[W]hether the statement happens to be one of fact or
opinion if it is inconsistent with the witness' testimony then
the jury should have it for consideration in weighing the
veracity of the witness and the accuracy of his testimony.
*

. .

A man may express in the form of an opinion a belief

or an implied fact as much at variance with his factual
testimony as would be a contradictory statement of fact.262
258. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 166 A.2d 529, 531 (1961); Rudisill
v. Cordes, 333 Pa. 544, 552, 5 A.2d 217, 219 (1933); Kridler v. Philadelphia,
180 Pa. 78, 36 A. 405 (1897); Henry v. Somerset County, 105 Pa. Super. 441,
443, 161 A. 881, 882 (1932) (allocatur refused).
259. 4 JONES § 26:8; McComvncK § 35; 3A WIGMORE § 1041. See generally Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses,
52 CORNEZLL L.Q. 239, 254-55 (1966); Grady, The Admissibility of a Prior
Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 224
(1956); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 810 (1945); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 289 (1930).
260. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.

261. 3A WIGMORE § 1041. See Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility:
Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 254-55 (1966); Grady, The
Admissibility of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 224, 230-39 (1956).
262. With respect to statements of fact, this is not true unless, of course,
a jurisdiction admits prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.
See notes 154-55 supra. In these jurisdictions it would then seem to follow
that prior inconsistent statements of opinion would have the same probative

value that opinions received in testimony have. It is questionable what
status an opinion offered to impeach testimony as to facts would have because of the elementary difference in form.
263. Grady, The Admissibility of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment, 41 CoRNLL L.Q. 224, 231 (1956). See McCoRMICK
§ 35.

The relevant question is whether any inconsistency exists rather
than whether the forms of the inconsistent statements are identical. 264 The modern trend appears to be the reception of prior inconsistent opinion to impeach present testimony regardless of form.265
Inconsistency, of course, is still the principal test of admissibility. 26
The regular foundational rule seemingly should apply whether the
prior inconsistent opinion is used to impeach an in court opinion
or a factual assertion. 2 7 In Pennsylvania, where the differing
characteristics of the several sorts of witnesses lead to different
foundational rules, it follows that the category into which the
2 68
"prior opinion giver" is placed will determine which rule applies.

Having considered the major areas where the foundational
scheme comes into play, there exists a further consideration: timing. As has been discussed, some variation of a foundational rule
exists in Pennsylvania for all witnesses but those having the status
of parties 69 and hearsay declarants. Where a foundation is required, whether it be a variety of the strict foundational rule or
the judicial discretion rule, the foundational questions are ordinarily required to be temporally prior to extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement.2 70 It is thereby clear why the term 'foundation' was chosen as it evokes the expectation that some set of ques264. "[T]he only proper inquiry can be, Is there within the broad
statement of opinion on the general question some implied assertion of fact
inconsistent with the other assertion made on the stand?" (author's emphasis) 3A WIOMORE § 1041.
265. See 3A WIGMORE § 1031; Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility:
Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 254-55 (19 66); Grady, The
Admissibility of a PriorStatement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 224, 239 (1955); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 810 (1945).
266. It will still be up to the trial court to determine whether there
exists a prime facie inconsistency between the prior opinion and the present
testimony. See 3A WIGMORE

§

1041.

267. No discussion of foundational requirements for opinions which impeach have been discovered. The solution is apparent, however, when
viewed in light of their function, viz. demonstrating statements inconsistent
with present testimony. See Weilbacher v. Rudlin, 125 N.J.L. 631, 17 A.2d
538 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941); Wolfe v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 171 Misc.
707, 13 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. T. 1939).
268. For example, prior opinion of a party may constitute an admission.
See Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 166 A.2d 529 (1961); Salvitti v.
Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942); Rudisill v. Cordes, 333 Pa. 544,
5 A.2d 217 (1939). See also 2 JoNEs § 9:3; McCoRMICK § 264; 4 WIGMOPE
§ 1053.
269. See notes 216-31 and accompanying text supra.
270. With respect to the strict foundational rule, see Section lIlA (beginning at note 71) supra. With regard to the discretionary rule, this is
what "discretion" is all about. For example, UNIFom

RuLE 22 (b) provides

that extrinsic evidence may be excluded "unless the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to identify, explain
or deny the statement." The normal temporal sequence anticipated is foundation, then extrinsic evidence. This has been explicitly espoused in Pennsylvania. See note 134 and accompanying text supra. All other jurisdictions (except California and those states where the FnDERAL RULES have
been adopted) which have either a strict foundational rule or a judicial discretion rule take this position. See 3A WrnMoan § 1028 n.l.
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tions "builds" the basis upon which the structure of impeachment,
by extrinsic proof will be assembled.
However, two of the modern codifications of the rules of evidence, the California Evidence Code 271 and the new Federal
Rules 272 both of which codify the essence of the judicial discretion

rule, indicate that timing is inconsequential.27 8 Neither makes the
foundational questions a condition precedent to the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.
The propriety of this new approach must be considered in light
of the functions which the foundational questions perform. Despite
the purported utility of the subsidiary functions of the foundational
questions, 27 4 the overriding purpose of the foundational requirement has been to permit the witness to reconcile or explain the
inconsistency between his prior statements and his present testimony. 27 5 The question to be answered therefore is whether there
is any superiority to the witness having the opportunity to explain
before the extrinsic evidence is admitted rather than after.
The California rule, as exemplary of the new approach 276 is

initially similar to most other formulations of the judicial discretion
271. CAL. EvID. CoDE § 770 (West 1968), which provides:
Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence
of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent with any part
of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless:
(a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give
him an opportunity to explain or deny the statement; or
(b) The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action.
272. FEDERAL RuLE 613 (b), which provides:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice
otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of
a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 (d) (2).
273. The Law Revision Committee's comment to Rule 770 explicitly
notes that "[p]ermitting a witness to explain or deny an alleged inconsistent statement is desirable, but there is no compelling reason to provide the
opportunity for explanation before the inconsistent statement is introduced
in evidence." See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 770 (West 1968). The judge's discretion
to exclude the extrinsic evidence is operant only if there is a lack of crossexamination as to the inconsistent statement and the witness has been unconditionally excused. Id. See note 271 supra. The Advisory Committee's
note to FEDERAL RuLE 613(b) has a similar import and specifically cites the
comment to California Rule 770. See FssRL RuLE 613 (b).
274. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text supra.
275. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
276. The California rule has been chosen for ease of explanation. While
not isomorphic to the pertinent Federal Rule, the import as to timing is
the same. See notes 271-72 supra.

rule.27 7 The new exception which makes timing inconsequential
states that extrinsic evidence is admissible if "[t] he witness has not
been excused from giving further testimony in the action.1278 The
advantages of the rule thus transformed are manifest. The witness
is afforded the necessary protection in any case, and if he is not
present or has been excused, he may not be attacked unless the
court decides that the equities lie in the impeaching party's favor
as under the traditional judicial discretion rule. It also gives the
impeaching party the option of cross-examining the witness and
to recall and
laying a foundation or of excusing the witness subject
27 9
introducing the impeaching evidence unannounced.
The California rule is subject to criticism for failing to indicate
which party has the responsibility of recalling the witness to afford
him the opportunity to explain.28 0 As noted earlier, under both
the strict foundational rule and the judicial discretion rule, the
burden is on the impeaching party to give the witness a chance
to reconcile his incompatible statements. The failure of the California rule to specify who is to recall the witness and give him
rethis opportunity means that the impeaching party is not so
28
quired, effectively shifting the burden to the sponsoring party. '
Although it represents the majority view, 2 2 there is no obvious
reason why it is superior to place this burden upon the impeaching
party rather than on the sponsoring party. However, for those
jurisdictions which prefer that the impeaching party bear the burden, there is no reason why the timing element of the California
rule could not be adopted while still imposing the burden of allowing the witness to explain on the impeaching party. This could
be accomplished by explicitly requiring the impeaching party to recall the witness unless the sponsoring party or the witness himself
waives the chance to explain. Thus, if the impeaching party opts
to ignore the foundational questions while cross-examining the witness to be impeached, he would bear the responsibility of making
adequate assurances that the witness would have the opportunity
to explain. If such assurances were not forthcoming, the offer of
extrinsic proof may be refused. This clearly entails a broader exercise of discretion by the trial court as there would be additional
277. CAL. Evna. CODE § 770 (West 1968). See note 271 supra.
278. CAL. EviD. CODE § 770 (West 1968).
279. Note, Modification of the FoundationalRequirement for Impeaching Witnesses: California Evidence Code Section 770, 18 HAsTINGS L.J.
210, 216-17 (1966). For example:
Among other things, Section 770 will permit more effective crossexamination and impeachment of several collusive witnesses, since
there need be no disclosure of prior inconsistency before all such
witnesses have been examined.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 770, Comment (West 1968).
280. See note 271 supra.
281. See Note, supra note 279, at 220.
282. See 2 COmAD § 1149; 4 JONES § 26:3; McCoRmcK § 37; 3A WicMORE §§ 1027-28.
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factors to be considered before the extrinsic proof could be admitted, but these factors are neither too numerous nor so complex
as to be unmanageable. 28 3 Such a change in the judicial discretion
rule would be both feasible and salutory. The impeaching party's
position would be enhanced, yet his responsibility would not be
diminished as the trial court's28 4expanded discretion would still
operate to protect the witnesses.
V.

CONCLUSION

The aphorism, "Generalities admit of many exceptions" has a
clear application to the Pennsylvania position on the foundational
requirement for admission of extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent
statements. Parties and hearsay declarants, being somewhat special in the total context of a trial are automatically exempt from
any foundational rule. Their characteristics take them from within
the range of affairs to which a foundation is directed: hence, free
admissibility of extrinsic evidence is the proper approach.
The other types of witnesses discussed are all subject to some
foundational requirement, the judicial discretion rule applying to
ordinary witnesses, and a stricter requirement applying to the various subclasses of one's own witness. The major factor which fosters this difference in treatment is the very fact that Pennsylvania
courts have heretofore treated witnesses differently according to
their membership in a given class. This identity factor does not
exist when a uniform approach is taken towards all witnesses other
than parties, but this requires a major change in attitude towards
non-party witnesses. The classificatory scheme is artificial, based
upon general prohibitionary rules such as "leading questions are
not available on direct examination" or "one cannot impeach his
own witness." While these rules do have their exceptions, they still
283. The expanded set of circumstances the trial court would have to
consider in exercising discretion include: form and nature of the impeaching evidence; availability of the witness; the strength of the impeaching
party's assurances that he will be able to produce the witness at the proper
time for recall; some element of fairness to the sponsoring party; and
whether the order of evidence suggested by the impeaching party will unduly alter or affect the course of the trial. If the witness has already left
the court, or the impeaching party cannot make adequate assurances of
availability, the scope of discretion would be back to that involved under
the traditional judicial discretion rule.
284. This extension of the scope of discretion, and concomitant expansion of the impeaching party's arsenal is not outlandish, but rather a reasonable step which affords all necessary protections to the witness yet eliminates the remaining "cabalistic ritual" the judicial discretion rule engenders.
See note 273 supra.

ordinarily apply, identifying the witness with his
sponsor, rather
28 5
than simply as a witness before a judicial tribunal.
Pennsylvania was an innovator of the judicial discretion approach to the foundational rule, but general application of the rule
is not possible until this hierarchy of witnesses is shattered. It is
doubtful that anything less than legislative codification of the
rules of evidence, liberalizing the availability of leading questions,
will serve to make the judicial discretion rule generally applicable
to non-party witnesses. This step, albeit a radical one, is necessary
if the plethora of rules now existing are to be dispensed with in
favor of one well-founded approach.

CHARLES

R. ORENYO

285. The comment to UNnmom RuLE 20, which permits any party to
impeach any witness states the effect of the rule: "It makes the witness
the witness of the court as a channel through which to get to the truth."

